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ABSTRACT 
Port Governance and Transhipment Success: 
An international case-study comparison of 
the Freeport Container Port, Bahamas and 
the Port of Port-of-Spain, Trinidad and Tobago 
Jacob L. Fogels 
This paper examines the privatization and transhipment success at Freeport Container 
Port (FCP), Bahamas and Port of Port-of-Spain, Trinidad and Tobago (PPS). The thesis 
links port development and growth to the divergent governance structures of these two 
ports that share similar geographic advantages. FCP is located at the north-eastern apex 
of the transhipment triangle and is an example of a wholly private port, which is owned 
and operated by Hutchison Port Holdings (HPH), a subsidiary of Hutchison Whampoa. 
HPH is in a unique situation where they also act as the local government and own large 
expanses of land and an airport. This unparalleled level of private self-determination has 
allowed HPH to develop FCP into a very successful transhipment facility. PPS, on the 
other hand, has been struggling while its competitors continue to gain despite its strategic 
position at the south-eastern apex of the "Caribbean Transhipment Triangle." PPS, until 
recently, was owned and operated by Trinidad and Tobago's public port authority. Its 
restructuring program had lasted 13 years and did not meet the goals of the government. 
The traffic growth at PPS has paled in comparison to FCP, and the governance structures 
have played a key role in these differences. 
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Chapter 1 
Context and the Goals of the Thesis 
1.1 Purpose of the thesis 
The container shipping industry has been experiencing a number of remarkable 
changes that have dramatically altered its operations, and which in turn have profoundly 
impacted ports (Slack 1993). Ports around the world are adjusting to the changes in 
shipping patterns, work practices, and organizational realities of modern container 
shipping brought on by the increase of world trade due to globalization (Hoffmann 1998). 
Shipping companies have either consolidated or formed alliances that have greatly 
improved their power in the industry (Brennan 2002). Transnational terminal operators 
(TTOs) have recently followed the same course of concentration through merger and 
acquisition (Fossey 2006a), however, it is the shipping lines that still control the massive 
amounts of cargo. Shipping lines deploy large ships upon their major trade routes and 
these vessels require ports to invest heavily in new technology and change work 
practices. The use of the larger ships has also altered the structure of shipping routes. 
The majority of ocean bound traffic is concentrated on the east-west trade routes, and is 
serviced by large vessels that concentrate traffic on specific "hub" or "load-centre" ports. 
The cargo is then transhipped onto progressively smaller vessels, which service the 
smaller ports of a particular region (De Monie 1998). In 2005, transhipment traffic 
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 In 1991 the top five TTOs accounted for 17.8% of global container traffic and in 2004 that figure rose to 
41.2% (Fossey 2006a) 
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accounted for 30% of all container moves, about 125 million twenty-foot equivalent units 
(TEU) (Fossey, 2006b). 
For a port to meet a shipping line's strategic objectives as a hub, it must satisfy 
several criteria. First and foremost, the port must be located in a strategic position along 
global shipping routes (Beddow 2004). Ports must also have modern facilities that are 
operated efficiently and charge simple unitized rates (Frankel, 2002). Many ports in the 
Caribbean Basin are able to satisfy the first criterion, as the Caribbean Basin is situated at 
the crossroads of several trade routes. However, until recently, many of the ports in the 
region, which were predominantly public, did not satisfy the remaining criteria and were 
characterized by low productivity and out-dated technology and labour practices 
(Hoffmann, 2001b). 
Pressures from the industry to modernize along with several other motivating factors 
inherent to developing nations resulted in the final years of the 20 Century being a 
period where many nations in the Caribbean began to privatize their ports to either reduce 
expenditures, increase efficiency and/or capture the emerging transhipment market. The 
Caribbean Basin has seen, and continues to see, billions of dollars being invested in port 
facilities in the region by both private and public parties (Sommers 1999). Private 
management of the new or rehabilitated facilities has become a predominant practice in 
the Caribbean port industry. The private actors are mostly TTOs, with some local 
stevedore companies and shipping lines operating a few terminals (Hoffmann 2001a). 
These companies are profit driven, and it is clear that many of their ventures are designed 
to capture the notoriously fickle transhipment market. 
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The application of this profound institutional restructuring trend to the developing 
economies of the Caribbean Basin presents a significant opportunity to witness an 
integral facet of globalization at work. The purpose of this thesis is to examine the 
privatization experience at two ports in the Caribbean Basin: Freeport, Bahamas and the 
Port of Port-of-Spain, Trinidad and Tobago. These ports were selected from the many 
eligible alternatives for a variety of reasons. Each port occupies a strategic position 
within the basin, yet each port has followed a remarkably different path and has 
experienced very different levels of success. Freeport is one of the success stories in the 
basin, with unmatched traffic growth (2153% from 1993 to 2000) driven by a successful 
partnership with the largest TTO in the world, Hutchison Port Holdings and the Grand 
Bahama Port Authority. Port-of-Spain, on the other hand, represented a port in a 
strategic position yet with modest growth (179% from 1993 to 2000), and operationally it 
provided a link to the industry's past as a wholly public operated port. It is hypothesized 
that port governance, in particular privatization, plays a major role in shaping port 
performance. By selecting two ports with comparable geographical characteristics as 
potential transhipment centres, differences in performance may be linked to differences in 
the extent of privatization. This thesis will examine why Freeport, a wholly privatized 
port, has been able to establish itself as a successful hub, while Port-of-Spain has 
encountered difficulties in generating new traffic while it remains a port dominated by 
the public sector. 
The central questions to be examined are: 
1. What are the factors behind the difference between traffic growth at Freeport 
Container Port and traffic growth at Port of Port-of-Spain? 
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2. What have been the roles of the public sector and the private sector in both 
cases? 
3. Why is Port-of-Spain one of the last significant ports in the region to 
privatize? 
1.2 Methodology 
In order to situate the research problem within the broader context of port 
privatization, a literature review of this topic was undertaken. Literature was reviewed 
from a wide variety of sources, but primarily through the World Bank, the United Nations 
(via its Latin American division, the Economic Community of Latin America and the 
Caribbean (ECLAC) and the United Nations Council on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD)), and the journals Maritime Policy and Management, Transport Reviews, 
Transportation and Research A, Marine Policy and The Journal of Transport Geography. 
This was followed by an analysis of traffic data from 1990 to 2003 for ports in the 
Caribbean Basin, which was compiled from Containerization International Yearbooks. 
Focus was placed on the changes in throughput between the years 1994 and 2000, since 
data was more complete for these two years and the selected years represented a snapshot 
of the region before and after the extensive use of privatization and transhipment. 
Several ports showed significant growth, including Freeport. 
Trade magazines were also examined, such as Containerization International and 
Port & Harbours as well as documents published by the Caribbean Shipping 
Association. The emphasis on privatization and transhipment in the area became clear. 
Freeport container Terminal, Bahamas (FCP) and Port of Port-of-Spain, Trinidad (PPS) 
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emerged as two provocative cases in the Caribbean Basin to facilitate an international 
comparison. 
Site visits were made to each of the selected ports in August of 2003 and eight semi-
structured interviews were held with some important stakeholders and port officials. At 
PPS, an executive with the Port Authority was interviewed. Interviews were also 
conducted with officials at the local shipping association and shipping agents. 
Unfortunately, multiple requests for an interview with a member of the Ministry of 
Transportation and Works were unsuccessful. At Point Lisas, a rival container port in 
Trinidad, an extensive interview was conducted with the port manager. The library at the 
University of West Indies was also searched for relevant information during the visit to 
Trinidad. 
In Freeport, a site visit was conducted at the container terminal and an interview was 
granted with the port manager. An interview with an official from the Grand Bahama 
Port Authority, which is the private governing body and terminal owner, was not granted 
despite multiple requests and visits. However, local shipping agents and lines were more 
accommodating and provided interviews and the president of the local chamber of 
commerce was interviewed extensively and provided a wealth of knowledge about the 
Freeport situation. 
1.3 Outline of chapters 
Chapter two is the literature review. The subject of the literature review is port 
privatization. Particular attention is focused on the theoretical constructs that have been 
proposed to understand the varying levels of port privatization as well as an examination 
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of the motivations and perils of private participation in ports. Chapter three outlines the 
Caribbean shipping scene. The Caribbean Basin is defined and a detailed examination of 
the strategic position of the basin along major shipping routes is undertaken. The traffic 
in the region is analyzed and a discussion of the trend of transhipment indicates the role 
this plays in port development. The concept of the Caribbean transhipment triangle is 
explained, and an examination of the apex, centroid and base ports follows. This chapter 
concludes with a discussion of the ramifications of the current developments in the 
region. 
Chapter four presents the context for the case-studies of the Port of the Port of 
Port-of-Spain and Freeport, first focusing on the physical characteristics, followed by a 
discussion about the development of the individual port sites. Throughput is examined 
followed by an examination of the factors that have affected throughput growth. Chapter 
five provides the privatization analysis of the two sites, and compares and contrasts the 
two experiences highlighting the diversity that exists within this globally strategic 




2.1 The focus 
The purpose of this literature review is to examine the changing nature of the 
public port authority and the problem of privatization that has changed port governance. 
The examination focuses on the arguments for and against public involvement in port 
governance and the motives and perils of port privatization. 
2.2 Overview of port governance 
Administrative bodies that govern a port hold a relatively independent position 
between the state and the market, of which the structures will vary greatly. A port 
authority may have relationships with local, regional, and central governments, as well as 
dealing with private enterprise. This position creates a relationship between public and 
private actors where the division of responsibility and regulations becomes an ongoing 
feature (Stevens 1999). Before the 1980s, ports were largely state-owned enterprises 
(Kent & Hochstein 1998). A recent trend in the industry has been the restructuring of 
port administration, with increasing participation of the private sector (Sommers 1999). 
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2.3 Port privatization: definition and background 
The literature on port privatization has demonstrated the many privatization 
scenarios that can be pursued. Goss (1998) contests that port privatization should not 
follow the privatization policies of other industries, but should have a policy tailored to 
the specific needs of each port. Some analysts prefer to not use the term privatization 
(Baltazar & Brooks 2001; Brooks 2004), and use terms such as 'devolution' and 
'alternative service delivery' in its place. For the purpose of this thesis, port privatization 
will be used to encompass all port restructuring that seeks to incorporates the private 
sector to a greater extent than previously. 
UNCTAD (1998) defines port privatization as "The transfer of ownership of 
assets from the public to the private sector or the application of private capital to fund 
investments in port facilities, equipment, and systems." This broad definition is useful; 
however, the level of private participation and autonomy that the private sector varies 
greatly from case to case. Wiltshire (1988) found that port privatization schemes have 
been ad hoc with no clear definition. Everett & Robinson (1998) view the privatization 
of ports as not simply as transfer of ownership, but instead as a fundamental change of a 
port authority from a statutory body providing public services, to a corporation 
attempting to be competitive in a highly contested market. 
Despite the ambiguity, Cullinane & Song (2001) define four separate elements 
that together encompass the definition of privatization in their various forms. 
1. the 'privatization' of the financing of a service that continues to be produced by 
the public sector 
2. the 'privatization' of the production of a service that continues to be financed by 
the public sector (usually through taxation) 
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3. 'liberalization' - referring o the relaxation of and statutory monopolies or 
licensing arrangements that prevent private sector parties from entering markets 
previously exclusively supplies b the public sector 
4. 'denationalization' and 'load-shedding' - referring to the selling of public 
enterprises and the transfer of state functions to the private sector. 
There are several methods of port privatization. A common approach is to lease a 
port's services to a private operator for a period of time with specific stipulations. In 
cases where a new port is developed, terms such as BOO (build-own-operate), BOT 
(build-operate-transfer), and BOOT (build-own-operate-transfer) arise. Each of these 
schemes has subtle nuances. However, all essentially require a large investment from the 
private sector. The port operator is given a service tenure. The specifics of these 
arrangements vary from case to case. The most drastic form of privatization would entail 
an outright sale of the port's assets to the private sector, which can be achieved by stock 
flotation or sale to a corporation or individuals (UNCTAD 1998). 
2.4 The role of various actors and activities 
International comparisons of port administrations are aided by conceptual 
constructs that define port functions and ownerships into a matrix of ownership and 
operations. The World Bank (2003) has proposed an International Standard of Port 
Divisions (ISPD), which was originally developed by Goss in 1979. This model 
emphasizes the role of the public sector in relation to the penetration of the private sector 
within the port (see figure 2.1). 
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figure 2.1 - International Standard of Port Divisions (ISPD) 








A landlord port is one in which the basic infrastructural services such as berths, 
fire services, breakwaters, security, etc are provided by the public. All other operations 
and services such as stevedoring and warehouseing are provided by the private sector. A 
tool port is one which the public provides all its infrastructural as well as superstructural 
services, with the private sector employed to move or warehouse cargo, however they are 
not expected to invest capital in the port. A service port has all the services, facilities, 
and operations of the port provided by the public sector. (World Bank 2003) 
This model has been modified by several academic researchers (Baird 2000a & 
2000b and Cullinane & Song 2001). They propose a matrix based on three distinct port 
functions called The Port Function Privatization Matrix (PFPM). 
1. Regulatory function: Statutory powers given to a port's management 
(either private or public). This can be regarded as the primary role of a 
port authority and can include activities such as maintenance, 
conservation, traffic management, law enforcement, licensing, safety, and 
balancing interests. 
rr , ^ _ Service 
Tool 
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2. Landowner function: Typical responsibilities include management and 
development of the port estate, implemention of port policies and 
development strategies, coordination of port marketing and promotion 
acitivites, provision and maintainance of port infrastructure and 
intermodal connections. 
3. Operator (Utility) function: The physical transfer of goods and passengers 
between sea and land. 
The division of responsibility of these three functions between the private and 
public sector creates a matrix of influence exercised within any given port. Four main 
patterns emerge as outlined in the table 2.1 below. 
table 2.1 - Port Function Privatization Matrix (PFPM) 
Port functions 
Port models Regulator Landowner Operator 
PUBLIC public public public 
PUBLIC/private public public private 
PRIVATE/public public private private 
PRIVATE private private private 
Source: Cullinane & Song 2001 
A PUBLIC port is a port in which all three functions are controlled by the 
government or public authority and is also known as a comprehensive port. The Port of 
Singapore (PSA) is an example of such a port. A PUBLIC/private port is one where the 
operator function is controlled by the private sector, and the regulatory and landowner 
functions control still rest in the hands of the state. This is common in North America, 
where private actors, via leases or concessions, operate terminals. PRIVATE/public ports 
have the private sector performing the landowner and operator functions, while the 
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regulatory role remains in the hands of the state. Hong Kong is the prime example, as 
private companies build their own terminals, yet the government is responsible for vessel 
traffic management, other regulatory polices, and planning for new terminal 
development. A PRIVATE port is one where the three functions of a port are completely 
in the hands of the private sector. The UK has many examples, such as Felixstowe, 
where governments have little control of these interests under such an arrangement. 
When the top container ports of the world are examined, it becomes evident that 
the governments are wary of ceding too much control to the private sector. The vast 
majority of port administrations have opted for the PUBLIC/private model (see table 2.2), 
which allows the port authority to retain control while enacting market forces (Cullinane 
& Song 2001). An additional reason for the prevalence of this privatization model is that 
cargo handling and its revenue are more easily defined and thus more easily packaged 
separately from other port services, thus more easily privatized (UNCTAD 1998). 
Combine these two factors with outdated facilities and inefficient practices, and cargo 
handling lends itself quite well to privatization and the separation of this service from 
other port functions allows a port authority to have the benefits of effective private 
management while maintaining a high level of control. 
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table 2.2 - Ownership status of the world's top container ports 
Port PUBLIC 
PUBLIC/ PRIVATE/ 
private public PRIVATE 
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Classified as defined by the pan function matrix due to Baird (1995b, 1997). 
5W«v Cms (1996; 167). 
2.5 Arguments for a public port authority 
A primary justification for a port authority is control over property rights. A port 
has property elements that extend from the land into the water. There is a totally 
different legal regime that applies to the water as opposed to the one that exists for land. 
Therefore, it may be in the public's interest to have control over a port's land and 
adjacent water for environmental and safety reasons (Goss 1990c). In a 1999 
International Association of Ports & Harbors survey of 188 ports, it was found that 
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public ownership of breakwaters and access channels was ubiquitous, and private 
ownership was negligible (Baird 2001 & 2002) (see fig 2.2). 
Fig 2.2 - Ownership of port assets 
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Secondly, there is a need for planning that might best be left to public authorities. 
Land use conflicts may arise between the port, local residents and businesses. The 
interests of a private port developer may not coincide with municipal or central planning 
agendas (Goss 1990c). However, this implies that the planning and policy carried out by 
public authorities is rational and beneficial to society with proper implementation, 
otherwise this advantage may be negated. Third, the significance of the port as a public 
good must not be overlooked (Baird 2004). A public port authority offers some services 
that may not be offered sufficiently nor satisfactorily, or sometimes not at all, by a private 
operator. A private operator is more likely to concentrate on profitable services at the 
expense of other essential port services. Buoys or breakwaters are essential services, yet 
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they have a fixed cost that does not change despite the number of users and can be 
justifiably neglected by businesses as sunk costs (Goss 1990c). In addition, private port 
operators can more easily justify discriminatory practices, which could lead to exclusion 
of some clients (UNCTAD 1998). 
Fourth, a public port authority would also be more apt to deal with the 
externalities of a port's operation. Issues such as safety, pollution, congestion, 
hinterland access, and aesthetics would take priority with a public administration, and 
they would be more able to affect desired changes. Some of these issues would most 
likely need to be forced upon the agenda of a private port operator through regulation. 
(Cullinane & Song 2001) 
A final advantage of a public port authority is that they may promote greater 
efficiency in the port. Ports often represent spatial monopolies that can be abused (Slack 
1994). This concern is greatest when considering the privatization of a port with limited 
cargo loads and limited intra-national competition since its monopolistic position is 
enhanced (Kent & Hochstein 1998). It is in society's best interest to not have a private 
company gain a monopolistic position rewarded by using the economic rents of the port 
in the form of profits. These profits can be to the detriment of the economy at large. 
Goss (1990c) argues that profits are not a good reflection of efficiency. Profits are just a 
reflection of an ability to make profits. It is argued (Stevens 1999) that the profits 
realized by a private port operator, will be a result of the exploitation of the customer, 
employees and the environment. This could lead to an increase in public costs as private 
profits increase. 
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2.6 Arguments against public port authorities 
The primary argument against public port authorities is the constraints of public 
bureaucracy. These bodies are established, usually with a statute, which could prove 
ineffective in practice and may not be flexible enough to deal with change and/or the 
powers granted may be too narrow (Goss 1990b). Bennett (1995) identifies the 
bureaucratic legacy of India as the greatest challenge to port privatization, and ultimately 
the poor performance of Indian container ports. Changing circumstances can become 
problematic, as many layers of bureaucracy must be penetrated to affect a desirable 
outcome. For instance, the port authority of Vancouver, Canada had to wait up to 26 
months to get approval to spend its retained revenues and it took two years and cost the 
port $250,000 to sell a piece of land worth $95,000 (Ircha 1997). It is difficult for ports 
compete in the present marketplace with such restrictions on their operation. 
Another issue inherent to a large bureaucratic control over a port is subsidization 
and cross-subsidization. Direct subsidization is the public funding of a port and indirect 
subsidization occurs in the form of the public sector paying for things such as the 
dredging of a harbour, yet not recovering the costs (Hoffman 1998). This practice can 
lead to a port having an unfair competitive advantage. Cross-subsidization, on the other 
hand, is usually done by taking excess revenue from a core-business to fund a non-core 
operation, which does not yield a monetary profit and ports subject to this type of activity 
can be left with a comparative disadvantage (Goss 1990c). Furthermore, once a 
subsidized port is privatized the subsidies stop and tax revenues are generated, thus 
potentially benefiting public treasuries by eliminating an expense and creating new 
income (Institute of Public Affairs 1994). In the case of the US, many ports are publicly 
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funded by varying levels of government, with much of the justification for this practice 
based on the creation of competition; however, this subsidized competition will not breed 
the efficiency expected from competition since each port is able to rely on the public 
sector to maintain their position (Helling & Poister 2000). 
A second argument against public port authorities is that they are not subject to 
the ordinary discipline of the market. In other words, the port is not required to make 
money and in some cases is not expected to even cover costs. This can lead to a situation 
where ports are either unwilling or unable to sufficiently react to market forces (Ircha 
1997). Brooks (2004) argues that service ports can lead to the wasteful use of resources. 
Cullinane & Song (2001) found that market forces have a significantly greater impact 
upon the performance of private sector enterprises than on those in the public sector and 
pointed to several studies conducted in the 1970s, which concluded that ports operated 
directly by governments or public agencies and owned by the public sector are more 
expensive and less efficient. 
Related to this is what Goss (1990c) called "The Monumental syndrome." This is 
where a government attempts to use the port to gain visibility within the community 
and/or a governmental leader uses the port as instrument of his/her legacy. In Canada the 
motive of visibility was one rationale behind the federal government funded widespread 
effort to construct ports across Canada that were barely, if not at all, commercially viable 
(Slack 1994). 
A final and serious issue with public port authorities is that of political or 
regulatory capture. This is where a person or interest group is able to exert their 
influence over the administration or regulatory board (Goss 1990c). In extreme cases this 
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would be termed corruption. Another related issue is that of political interference, where 
port policies or developments may be skewed for political reasons. This was the case in 
Britain in the 1960s when investment for one port was blocked in parliament and 
eventually diverted to another port (Slack 1994). 
2.7 Public motivations for private involvement 
"When carried out properly, and for the right reasons, port privatization offers 
port users and the economy as a whole many benefits" (Baird 2000a, 19). There are 
many reasons why a government would want to include private participation, and which 
form is utilized often reflects which motivation was strongest in their effort (Brooks 
2004). UNCTAD (1998) created an extensive list of motivations from varying 
perspective that are outlined in table 2.3 below. 
Upon examination, motivations for private involvement fall into two broad 
categories: the philosophical or the practical. Eyre (1990) attests that the privatization of 
a port is a philosophical decision that is based on the same objectives as deregulation, 
free trade, laissez-faire economics and user-pay concepts. Cullinane & Song (2001) 
found that in many cases port privatization schemes were typically a result of political 
will rather than rational cost-benefit social analysis. UNCTAD (1998) also attests that 
for privatization to succeed there has to be political motivation; whereas in the case of the 
UK, Thomas (1994a) found that the privatization movement was based on a belief that 
the private market is most efficient way to allocate resources. 
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table 2.3 - Perceived advantages and beneficiaries of port privatization 
Beneficiary Perceived advantages 
Port Authority 
Terminal operator 
! possibility to more readily define its priority corporate objectives, thanks to greater 
(or complete) freedom from government controls; 
! greater freedom from public sector constraints, particularly with respect to 
personnel management, pricing, budget review and its sanction, by higher authority, 
administrative impediments, and procurement of equipment: and services; 
! increased ability to define precise financial targets; 
! increased accountability in line with set targets; 
! greater transparency of costs, greater likelihood of tariff's being cost-related, 
reduced risk of cross-subsidization; 
! a better distribution of port charges and dues particularly in the case of service 
ports, as these tend to undercharge the ship and overcharge the cargo; 
! increased responsibility for the private investor with regard to the level of 
infrastructure investments necessary to carry on with his business; 
! opportunity to bring into the country foreign management and technical expertise 
as required; 
! greater potential for the diversification of activities: 
! freedom to subcontract to third parties any activity the company does not want to 
pursue itself (or does less well); 
! fall accountability with respect to achieving the set operational and financial 
targets; 
! cost transparency allowing for cost-related tariffs and a curb on the practice of 
cross-subsidization; 
I availability of customer-tailored quality services; 
Port customers ! quicker, more effective response to users' service requirements; 
! reduction in prices for port services, as competing units will make efforts to reduce 
costs and prices to attract traffic away from competing ports; 
The world and the 
national economy 
! increased responsiveness to changes in market structures and demand; 
[ faster adaptation to changes in maritime transport technology and intermodal 
transport; 
National government 
! reduction of the financial and administrative burden on the government 
! creation of additional tax revenues for the Government as private operators pay 
their taxes (contrary to statutory port authorities, which often try to escape them) 
and the increase in business levels, 
Source: UNCTAD 1998 
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Sommers (1999) argues that the shift to privatization was precipitated by strong 
political pressure enacted by 'captive port users,' who were growing frustrated as their 
trade expanded yet, they continued to deal with inefficient port operations, high user fees 
and insufficient facilities. In the case of India, major shipping lines would not offer 
mainline service to many of its ports because of inefficiency, such as ship turnaround 
times of five to six days in comparison to neighbouring ports such as Singapore where 
turnaround time is measured in hours. Indian port inefficiency relegated this important 
economy to second tier status, which had a negative impact on Indian exports 
(Sashikumar 1998). Like India, public authorities around the world were unsuccessful at 
meeting the demands of the shipping lines, and began searching for answers. A few 
container terminal operations specialists emerged as promoting best practices with new 
technology, and achieving enviable economies of scale. These companies found 
themselves in high demand and expanded operations and were later labelled as 
transnational terminal operators (Slack & Fremont 2005). 
Given these circumstances, improved efficiency of a port's operations and service 
quality due to private management by port operations specialists is the primary motive 
cited in the literature (Ircha 2001). Many public ports in developing countries were 
acting as bottlenecks to economic development due to inefficiency (Fernandez et al 
1999). More specifically, crane use efficiency is the key aspect of terminal operational 
efficiency, which itself is the most important factor in determining port performance 
(Tongzon 1995). Any reform policy aimed at improving port performance should be 
focused on such improvements. This is clearly seen in practice, as the PUBLIC/private 
arrangement is the arrangement of choice in most ports (see table 2.2), which only 
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privatizes the operator function, whilst the public sector retains a landowner and 
regulatory function. 
A survey of the top 100 ports in the world conducted by Napier University in 
2000 (Baird 2002) found that 50% of responding port authorities2 had the goal to reduce 
port costs through more efficient operations (see figure 2.3). Also cited by respondents 
was the aim of bringing in 'know-how' from the private sector. Shipping lines have 
compounded the pressure to improve efficiency with the practice of separating terminal-
handling-charges and port-to-port charges in freight rates (Fung et al 2003). Since the 
implementation of this practice in 1991, ports have to answer to both shippers (who have 
seen their shipping costs rise as a result) and shipping lines, which have become more 
powerful in their cartels. Ports need to focus on efficiency to remain competitive. 
Further support for private operational specialists is also found in the Napier 
University survey results. Port Authorities were asked what the perceived benefits have 
been from their privatization experience. 31% of respondents (see figure 2.4) cited 
management expertise as a major advantage of privatization (Baird 2001 & 2002). 
Thomas (1994b), on the other hand, argues that change can happen within existing 
institutional frameworks, and can be achieved by focusing on changing people's beliefs 
and values. The Port of Singapore (PSA) is the most common example cited (Slack & 
Fremont 2005) in support of this assertion, yet it stands in relative isolation amongst a sea 
of evidence of relative private efficiency. 
2
 48 of the 100 container port authorities responded. Together they represented 64% of the world's TEU 
moves. 
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figure 2.3 - Aims behind bringing in the private sector 
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"The private sector has made a significant contribution towards the successful 
modernization and operations of today's global seaport industry" (Baird 2000a, 14). In 
Argentina, port privatization resulted in efficiency gains that saw a 50% reduction in 
container handling prices in a five-year span (Serebrisky & Trujillo 2005). Cullinane et 
al (2002), however, found that in the case of Asian ports there is no irrefutable link 
between private participation and efficiency; but a positive relationship between the two 
can be seen. This study also concluded that ports with higher throughputs tended to be 
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more efficient, which raises a chicken or the egg discussion. Tongzon (2005), agreed that 
private sector participation improves port operational efficiency. The PRIVATE/public 
model produced the best results. His findings also showed that operational efficiency is 
very important to gain competitive advantage. Also cited by Tongzon (2005) was that 
the flexibility of private operators to meet the demands of their customers enhances a 
port's competitiveness. 
Operational efficiency can be an end in itself and it is often tied to economic and 
trade-oriented policy goals. Everett and Robinson (1998) found that governments not 
only seek to improve port efficiency, but also seek to improve its national 
competitiveness. At the local level, world class ports can have a very positive effect on 
the economy. For example, Felixstowe had a multiplier effect of 5:1, meaning that every 
job within the port stimulated the creation of five other jobs in the community (Baird 
1999). Cullinane & Song (2001) point out several expected economic benefits from 
improved port performance from port privatization, such as: 
• Lower total transportation costs of imports and exports 
• Stimulation of international trade 
• Greater competitiveness in the international trade arena 
• More consumer choice 
• Lower or even zero government subsidies in the port sector 
• Promotion of investment 
• Potentially improved employment opportunities 
• Greater potential for exploiting economies of scale 
Each case may be different, yet generally one or more of these are the efficiency-led-
goals set by public administrators in their policies of privatization in the port sector. 
The Napier University survey found that 27% of respondents hoped to expand 
trade via privatization, and in reflection, 38% of respondents cited trade growth as a 
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major advantage of port privatization (Baird 2001 & 2002). This shows that some ports 
are realizing trade benefits from privatization that they had not considered before 
privatization. These benefits rest on the economic reality that ports are needed to 
facilitate trade and port costs are reflected in the price of goods that pass through them 
(Goss 1990a). The Argentine government estimates that the port reform saved the 
economy $156 million annually (Estache & Carbajo 1996). India's exports were at a 
competitive disadvantage due to its high port costs that could not be offset by India's low 
wages (Sashikumar 1998). As global trade increases, ports become even more 
economically significant. Stevens (1999) metaphorically mused that "Seaports are the 
mouths through which continents speak to each other." (43) 
The present global environment, with specialized transnational terminal operators 
propagating their efficient methods around the world, has resulted in the industry seeing a 
'bottom line' that is being achieved by many ports in the terms of costs and operational 
efficiency (Baird 2000a). Any port that varies from this is going to be disadvantaged 
relative to other ports that achieve greater efficiency. The concern for policy makers is 
that if their ports are not operating at this 'bottom line' level, their region's industrial 
outputs will be at a comparative disadvantage to other regions with efficient ports (Goss 
1990a). 
Compounding their desire to privatize is that governments wish to reduce their 
long-term financial and administrative responsibilities, as the costs of operating a port 
continue to climb (Hoffmann 2001c). Frankel (1992) argues that this phenomenon is also 
tied to the increased capital intensity in port operations and concentration within the 
shipping industry. Privatization can shift the cost of operating a port from the state to the 
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customer (Comtois 1999). Reducing the cost to the public sector was a motivation for 
27% of the Napier survey respondents, whilst in hind-sight, the sharing of investment 
was the main advantage of privatization cited by 50% of the respondents (Baird 2001 & 
2002). Frankel (1992) points to a related motive of debt-equity conversion, where port 
privatization is used as a method of reducing public debt incurred by operating a port into 
equity or other assets. Governments, especially those in developing nations, might not 
have the capital to, nor wish to, invest in expensive port equipment, and have looked to 
private capital as a way of modernizing out-dated port facilities without directly 
burdening public treasuries (Heaver 1995). 
An additional motivation found in the literature, is a desire to reform labour 
practices. Outdated labour practices have been cited as a major reason for the continued 
loss of market share in French terminals (Slack & Fremont 2005). In some public 
operated ports, labour would represent up to 75% or more of its annual budget (Kent & 
Hochstein 1998). The UK experience demonstrates this issue as Baird (1999) found that 
Felixstowe, a wholly private port and the UK's top container port, prospered in relation to 
its competitors since it was not restricted by having unionized workers. In Colombia, 
labour reform and the related port privatization resulted in impressive improvements in 
productivity, such as a reduction of ship turnaround time from an average of 10 days to 
hours, and lower fees for port users, such as a price drop from $600 to $150 for each 
container move; not to mention significant returns for concessionaires (Gaviria 1998). 
Labour reform should be seen as a prerequisite for port privatization, not a reason 
to privatize; however, there are numerous privatization experiences that were flawed 
because labour reform was not conducted ahead of time (UNCTAD 1998). The Napier 
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survey asked respondents about the importance of labour reform in attracting private 
sector investment. 52% of respondents found it to be of importance, with 17% of 
respondents feeling that it was critical, (see figure 2.5) 40% of respondents did not find 
this as significant, however, it is pointed out that many of the respondents were from 
geographic areas that had already completed the labour reform process prior to 
privatization (Baird 2002). 
figure 2.5 - Importance labour reforms for port privatization 
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Other unique motivations have been cited in certain cases. In Canada and the UK, 
the outright sale of public ports was seen as a way to raise money for the public treasury, 
and in the case of Canada, to reduce the national debt (Ircha 1993). Other goals include 
attempts to elevate intra- and inter-port competition and to widen share ownership (Baird 
2000a). 
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2.8 Perils of port privatization 
Many of the disadvantages of port privatization would entail a neglect or absence 
of the benefits of a public port authority discussed in the early section about the benefits 
of a port authority. For instance, there is a concern that private interests might lead to a 
neglect of public goods such as the environment. There is also the loss of planning 
coordination and fears of private ports excluding certain stakeholders from using the port. 
In addition to these concerns, several studies have found that there is little 
evidence to suggest private operators are more efficient than public operators. These 
studies show no difference in efficiency between private and public management and in 
some cases that public management fared better than private management (Cullinane & 
Song 2001; Stevens 1999). In several cases where private enterprise has been successful, 
it has been shown that the management was not the key factor in the success, which 
strengthens the argument that ownership is not the key factor that determines operational 
efficiency. In the UK, Saundry and Turnball (1997) found that the private ports did not 
outperform, and in some cases were outperformed by, the remaining public ports; and 
that any improvement was a result of the abolishment of the National Dock Labour 
Scheme, a labour reform movement that did not need privatization to occur, nor reap the 
benefits from. Liu (1995) looked at port ownership specifically and failed to identify 
ownership as a factor contributing to efficiency advantages. Geographic circumstances 
such as location and trade patterns have been more important factors for success in some 
cases (Thomas 1994b), whereas it was competition and labour reform that has led to 
improved efficiency elsewhere (Estache & Carbajo 1996). Furthermore, if privatization 
does not realize its goals of improved efficiency (or worse yet, is less efficient), the 
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region will still be in the same position as when it started, yet the government will be 
without one asset and lacking control over an important aspect of its economy. 
Control is another important issue public authorities face when looking to 
privatize. The most common response in the Napier University survey to the question of 
the disadvantages of private investment in ports was a loss of control at 31% (see figure 
2.7) (Baird 2002). Public planning initiatives and the coordination of investment can 
become difficult to implement (UNCTAD 1998). Also, ports constitute a public good, 
and offer a diverse set of services that can either be neglected or denied if operating under 
business ethics. This is especially true if a monopolistic position is being privatized (Goss 
1990a). Issues may arise, which can be more difficult to ameliorate than if the port had 
remained in the hands of the public (UNCTAD 1998). Furthermore, in the case of 
developing nations, it is argued (Fernandez et al 1999) that a monopolistic position is 
produced at first to garner enough traffic to achieve economies of scale before 
introducing significant competition. This scenario can be easily abused. It is important 
that public authorities always ensure that proper legal relations are constructed before 
privatization to safeguard against these concerns (Stevens 1999). 
figure 2.6 - Main disadvantages of private sector investment in ports 
Source: Baird 2002 
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Another important issue raised was the concept of political ambiguity, which was 
cited by 27% of the Napier University survey respondents (see fig. 2.6) (Baird 2002). 
This is especially true in cases of joint ventures, where the public and private sector are in 
a partnership. Even in situations where the private actor's role is limited, there is also 
concern that they may be able to influence the port authority since they would have 
greater access and their interest in success is mutual. Goss (1990a) termed this as 
political or regulatory capture. Conversely, Everett (2003) found that Australia's port 
reform success was hindered by bureaucratic intervention. 
Other concerns that government bodies have with port privatization is the loss of 
a key policy tool. For instance, ports can be conceptualized as a way to provide 
employment in a given area (Goss 1990a). Changes of port policy can be unpopular and 
can surface come election time (Slack 1994) or lead to work stoppages (Morris 2000). 
Port privatization requires a rationalization of labour which typically leads to labour 
reform (Hoffmann 1998). This usually entails a mass reduction in staff along with a 
change of required skills (Marges 1999). In some cases working conditions deteriorate as 
a result of intense price competition (Turnball & Weston 1992). Furthermore, labour 
reform can also be costly for the public sector. At Cartagena, the workforce decrease 
from 2718 in 1992 to 884 in 1994, and much of that reduction was completed via early 
retirement severance packages which have cost the government US$290 million (Kent & 
Hochstein 1998). Colombian labour reform exacerbated unemployment levels and led to 
massive social problems, and it is suggested that labour reform needs to address these 
potential consequences with a stronger emphasis on retraining (Gaviria 1999). Venezuela 
suffered similar turmoil as port reform in 1991 led to the lay-off of 10,279 dock workers 
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and 2,000 officials in the National Ports Institute and cost the government USD 182 
million in severance packages (ECLAC 1999). 
A final concern for both the public sector and the private sector is the 
compensation received for the sale of the port assets, which is a greater problem when 
considering the outright sale of a port's assets. The sales of UK ports were between 5 
and 25% of their real market value (Brooks 2004). In the case of the privatization of the 
port of Bristol (Bassett 1993), the port authority had spent a considerable amount of 
money upgrading the facility, yet was unable to attract enough business to recover their 
costs. The port received an unsolicited offer from two entrepreneurs, which resulted in a 
150-year concession for the money losing port. Shortly after the concession was granted, 
the new owners signed an extremely lucrative joint venture with National Power to build 
one of the most modern bulk handling terminals in Europe. This led Saundry and 
Turnball (1997) to characterize the port privatization movement in the UK as one that 
made millionaires out of private port owners at the expense of the public. 
2.9 Port privatization trends in the developing world during the 1990s 
The 1990s was a period of rapid privatization in developing countries, which saw 
an estimated USD 250 billion in privatization revenue (Parker & Kirkpatrick 2005). 
Ports were no exception as from 1990 to 1998, the private sector invested more than $9 
billion USD in 112 common-user port projects in the developing world (see figure 2.7) 
(Sommers 1999). 
The bulk of the investment in the developing world was concentrated in Latin 
America and Caribbean, as well as East Asia and the Pacific (See table 2.4), which 
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corresponds with trends in privatization in other infrastructure such as water, sewage, and 
electricity (Sommers 1999). The majority of this investment occurred in only five 
countries, as seen in figure 2.8. 
figure 2.7 - Port privatization in developing nations Source: Sommers 1999 
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figure 2.8 - Port privatization by country 
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2.10 Conclusions 
Global shipping trends have required governments to make choices regarding 
their container ports, and an emphasis on modernization and the expected efficiency 
gains has led to a worldwide phenomenon of private sector involvement in what was 
largely the domain of the public sector. Embedded within this trend is a belief that the 
private sector is better at operating ports than the public sector; however, debate exists in 
the literature about the merits and perils of public versus private sector management. 
Regardless, there is an over-arching belief amongst the majority of industry analysts that 
the private sector is superior and this belief is framed by values of efficiency and 
competition, which are two very important facets in port operations. Within this 
framework, the public good provided by a container port is conceptualized as lower 
overall transportation costs and the expected elimination of subsidization. 
The most common form of port privatization is the PUBLIC/private arrangement, 
which demonstrates the importance that public authorities place on their container ports. 
The majority of the public sector still views ports as significant nodes in national 
transportation systems and policies; and the private sector is seen as a means to the ends 
of a modern and efficient terminal. 
Within this framework, four foci of analysis emerge. The basic form of port 
privatization analysis can focus on the methods used and the institutional structures that 
are made through the privatization process. A second form of analysis can be undertaken 
to examine the motivating factors behind port privatization. A third form of analysis 
involves examining changes in port operations. The fourth form of analysis can attempt 
to evaluate the social, economic, and environmental impact of the port privatization 
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process. This is a very difficult undertaking that requires an extensive amount of data 
collection and any results drawn from such a study will be limited at best (Parker & 
Kirkpatrick 2005). 
For the purpose of this thesis, the first, second and third forms of analysis will be 
utilized for both cases. Attempting to analyze the social, economic, and /or 
environmental impact of privatization is beyond the scope of this thesis. Attempting to 
gauge the economic and social impact in Port-of-Spain would be hasty since the transfer 
to private management occurred in 2006. In the case of Freeport, the port has only 
recently emerged as a dominant node in the Caribbean Basin, and its development is not 
complete; therefore an analysis of its impact would be more beneficial once their 
ambitious plans are completed or abandoned and allowed time to mature. 
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Chapter 3 
The Caribbean Basin 
3.1 Overview 
For the purposes of this study, the Caribbean Basin includes the Caribbean Sea 
and the Gulf of Mexico. The Eastern border is limited to the Antilles in the southeast to 
The Bahamas in the northeast. The Basin covers an area of 4.4 million square kilometers 
with over 56,000 kilometers of coastline, bordering on 33 countries (see table 3.1). 
table 3.1 - Characteristics of the Caribbean Basin 
Attributes 
Size (km2) 
Coastline length (km) 
Number of bordering countries 
GNP of countries 
• excluding the US 
• including the US 
Per capita GNP of countries 
• excluding the US 









Source: McCalla et al 2005 
The Caribbean Basin is an area of contrasts. One finds many different nations of 
varying geographic sizes, population sizes and levels of economic growth. The Northern 
portion of the basin is occupied by the USA, which has the largest economy in the world. 
Bordering the basin on the south and west are developing countries with large 
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populations: Mexico, Venezuela, and Colombia. The remaining countries within the 
basin are relatively small. The center and eastern portions of the basin are occupied 
mostly by island states, such as Jamaica, Cuba, the Bahamas and Trinidad & Tobago. 
(McCalla et al 2005) 
3.2 Global position 
The Caribbean Basin is situated at the crossroads of a number of important global 
trade routes (see fig. 3.1). The Panama Canal (represented by the star in fig 3.1) was 
constructed to facilitate many of the East-West trade routes and remains a focal point for 
this international trade. Trade from Asia to the Gulf and East Coasts of North America as 
well as Western Europe often passes through the canal and the basin; as does trade from 
the West Coasts of the Americas to the Gulf and East Coasts of North America and 
Western Europe. 
figure 3.1 - Trade routes traversing the Caribbean Basin 
Source www.mitpan.com 
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North and south trade routes also traverse the Caribbean Basin independent of the 
Panama Canal. Trade between the Gulf and east coasts of North America as well as 
Europe and the east coast of South America pass by several ports on the eastern portion 
of the region, however these trade routes do not produce as much cargo loads as the east-
west routes. Given the centrality (Fleming & Hayuth 1994) of the region, it is reasonable 
to expect this region to be an important link in international trade, however, the region 
remains largely on the margins of international trade, with the exception of the Gulf coast 
states. (McCalla et al 2005) 
3.3 Port throughput trends in the Caribbean Basin 
Recently, the strategic geographic potential of this region has been recognized and 
great efforts have been made to capitalize on this advantage. In the 1990s, approximately 
US$1.7 billion was spent on new container port capacity alone (Hylton 2003). This 
investment has coincided with increased throughput in the basin. From 1994 to 2002 the 
number of TEUs handled in Caribbean ports multiplied by a factor of 2.25, from 5.65 to 
12.75 million (see table 3.2) (McCalla 2005). In 1994, the ports with the highest 
throughput were located in areas with strong local economies. For instance, the ports 
with the largest throughputs were San Juan, Puerto Rico; Houston, Texas; New Orleans, 
Louisiana and Puerto Limon, Costa Rica. Each of these ports serviced a large hinterland. 
San Juan itself served as the dominate port in the region handling nearly three times that 
of its closest competitor, and this was largely due to the need to import most goods to the 
island. 
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By 2002, the region's throughput patterns were very different. There were 17 
ports handling in excess of 100,000 TEU, compared to only 13 in 1994. San Juan found 
itself in second place behind the group of terminals found at the Caribbean/Atlantic 
entrance to the Panama Canal, which experienced a 468% increase in throughput. 
Several other ports in the region saw drastic increases in throughput, such as Cartagena, 
Colombia at 422 %, Kingston, Jamaica at 314%, Puerto Cabello, Venezuela at 285% and 
Freeport, Bahamas, which went from handling almost no containers to handling 860,000 
in 2002. (McCalla et al 2005). These trends have continued for many of these ports. 
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3.4 The move to transhipment 
Transhipment is based on the hub-and-spoke networks that were first utilized by 
parcel delivery services and later by the airline industry. The rationale for transhipment 
lies in its ability to consolidate cargo at strategic ports on major routes. Massive vessels 
are employed and need to have full loads to achieve economies of scale, hence the need 
to consolidate cargo (Hoffmann 1998). The large vessels reach a port that is considered a 
hub to discharge cargo set for other locations upon smaller feeder-vessels, and take-on 
cargo funnelled into the hub-port from the feeder routes. Shipping companies have 
adopted transhipment as a way to reduce operational costs while extending its service to 
more ports with greater frequency and reducing the cost per km traveled (De Monie 
1998). 
Transhipment is taking a dominant position within the Caribbean. The Caribbean 
basin's strategic position along several trade routes is the cause (see figure 3.1). De 
Monie's (1998) "Multi-Layered Port Calls" theory, predicts a shipping industry where 
only major carriers and the alliances will service the major east-west trade routes, 
utilizing massive super-post-panamax vessels, which are capable of carrying upwards of 
15,000 TEU. These ships will only call at four or five 'global hubs'. The traffic will 
filter down through different levels of hubs and feeders, with the possibility of a 
container being transhipped an additional 3 times until it reaches its final port of 
destination. This theory rests on several assumptions, the most notable being that the cost 
savings due to the economies of scale achieved by using 15,000 TEU capacity container 
ships is greater than costs of transhipping a container once or even multiple times. 
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Frankel (2002) tested the validity of this assumption in the Caribbean Basin. He 
found that transhipment costs would have to be at the most $45 per container to justify 
transhipment instead of direct shipment on the basis of cost. Further justification for 
transhipment rests in the possibility of improved service and increased connectivity, both 
in terms of ports served and frequency of service. The growing size of ships servicing 
the north-south trade routes in the Americas can be interpreted as a first step towards a 
multi-layered network. Larger ships typically mean fewer ports of call, which can lead to 
greater transhipment opportunities throughout the shipping network (Hoffmann 2001b). 
The multi-layer port calls theory predicts a 'global hub' developing in or near the 
Caribbean. It's within this context that international interest in Caribbean ports recently 
rose to levels not seen since colonization. Transhipment has become the focus for 
alliance carriers in this globally strategic location with limited domestic traffic, and the 
international port sector has reacted quickly and forcefully by rehabilitating existing 
terminals and building new modern facilities at a dizzying pace, often in places that had 
no firms operating such terminals before transhipment. 
Several ports are striving to become the Caribbean 'global hub.' Twenty-two 
ports claim to be transhipment hubs, but in reality, there are up to ten ports that possess 
the credentials to be under consideration for hub status, and none are in the league of 
'global hubs' such as Singapore and Hong Kong (Ward 2003). According to Hoffmann 
(2001b), ports looking to become major hubs need to posses certain features. First, ports 
with high domestic traffic are advantaged, since a local traffic base helps attract vessels. 
Second, a port needs to offer low rates, and value added services. Third, transhipment is 
dependant on the terminal capacity and service reliability. Carriers want direct berthing 
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with high productivity, high security, and direct links to information systems. Efficiency 
and responsiveness to demands are hallmarks of successful, customer-oriented, 
transhipment hubs. 
The most important criterion for a potential hub, however, is its location (Ward 
2003). The Caribbean Basin is in a strategic global position, and within the basin one 
finds several ports that occupy excellent locations that require little deviation from major 
trade routes. An additional locational factor found in the Caribbean is the ability for ports 
to act as a 'cabotage by-pass port' (Hoffmann 2001b). The USA's Jones Act restricts 
foreign flagged vessels from the US cabotage trade, thus creating a demand for off-shore 
hub ports. 
In the region, all of the ports occupying transhipment inspiring locations are 
found within the Caribbean Basin Transhipment Triangle (see figure 3.2) (McCalla et al 
2005). The apexes of the Caribbean Transhipment Triangle are international trade route 
points of entry to the basin; the Panama Canal in the southwest; Port of Port-of-Spain, 
Trinidad in the southeast serving the traffic from the east coast of South America; and 
Freeport, Bahamas situated at the point of entry for cargo from the east coast of North 
America and northern Europe. Kingston occupies the centroid of the triangle and close 
by is the island of Hispaniola, whilst the base of the transhipment triangle is served by 
Puerto Cabello and Cartagena. (McCalla et al 2005) 
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figure 3.2 - The Caribbean 'Transhipment Triangle' 
Source: McCalla et al 2005 
3.4.1 Colon, Panama 
Situated at the Atlantic/Caribbean gate of the Panama Canal, Colon is a strategic 
location for international trade transhipment, since several major trade routes traverse 
through the canal. The Panama Canal adds an additional variable to the Caribbean 
transhipment market. The employment of post-panamax ships (vessels that are too large 
for the locks at the Panama Canal) on major trade routes has created the need to transfer 
containers onto smaller ships for the canal journey. Hutchison Port Holdings (HPH) is 
one transnational port operator that has capitalized on this need and has secured terminals 
at each end of the canal, Balboa near the Pacific gate and Cristobal at the 
Atlantic/Caribbean gate, which are operated by HPH's subsidiary Panama Ports 
Company (Llacer 2005). PPC reported 1.256 million TEU moves at their ports in 2006; 
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a 38% increase of throughput from 2005 (www.hph.comy The facilities in Colon are 
also located next to the largest free trade zone in the hemispheres. (McCalla et al 2005) 
figure 3.3 - Images of Panamanian ports operated by HPH 
Port of Cristobal - Source www.hph.com 
The Port of Colon has two other terminals operated by private transnational 
terminal operators. Manzanillo International Terminal (MIT) is operated by Stevedoring 
Services of America (SSA), which is an American company. MIT is the dominant 
terminal at Colon in terms of throughput, yet it experienced a 15% decline in 2006, when 
it moved 1.331 million TEU compared to 1.580 TEU in 2005. The third terminal in the 
Colon Port is the Colon Container Terminal operated by Evergreen since 1997. All of 
these terminals share proximity to the free trade zone. The one possible challenge ahead 
for Colon, is the proposed widening of the Panama Canal which has the potential to 
compromise its strategic position (Llacer 2006), and affect global shipping patterns 
(Nelson 2005). 
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figure 3.4 - Images of MIT and CCT 
Manzanillo International Terminal -
Source www.mitpan.com
 C o l o n Container Terminal - Source 
www.cct-pa.com 
3.4.2 Freeport, Bahamas 
Freeport is located at the northern apex of the Caribbean Transhipment Triangle, 
and occupies a very strategic position for two reasons. First, traffic originating from the 
Eastern Seaboard of North America, and Europe that is bound for the Panama Canal or 
Gulf Coast sail past this location, as well as north-south trade routes that access the east 
coast of North America. Second, Freeport is located only 65 miles off the coast of 
Florida, is able to act as a 'cabotage by-pass port' for cargo loads bound for multiple US 
ports from non-US flagged ships (McCalla et al 2005). 
3.4.3 Port of Port-of-Spain, Trinidad 
The Port of Port-of-Spain is situated at the south-eastern apex of the transhipment 
triangle, however, the port has not grown at the same pace as its rival apex ports. This 
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can be explained in part by the trade routes. The north-south routes have not been as 
productive as the east-west routes. However, Brazil and Argentina are important markets 
with great potential. Other factors include site difficulties, water-depth limitations as 
well as governance and labour reform issues. Port of Port-of-Spain, until recently, was 
still using out-of-date work practices, and the port was still under total government 
control. (McCalla et al 2005) 
A further challenge that PPS must face is the competition from Puerto Cabello in 
Venezuela, and within Trinidad from Point Lisas, a privately operated port. The issues 
have resulted in PPS moving significantly less containers than most of its hub 
competitors. In 2006, PPS moved 324,539 containers compared to 844,952 at Puerto 
Cabello in Venezuela and 711,529 at Cartagena, Colombia. 
3.4.4 Ports in the middle 
The largest port in this area is Kingston, Jamaica; whose traffic increased three-
fold from 1994 to 2002 (McCalla et al 2005), and it has sustained its growth through 
2005, with a throughput of 1,670,800 TEU, which represents a 57% increase in only 3 
years (CSA 2007). Kingston is a landlord port that is commercially focused. AP Moller 
operates the main terminal under a 5-year contract. 
Kingston's position, however, is being threatened from all sides. Its traditional 
rival, Rio Haina, experienced a marked loss in throughput in 2005. Rio Haina had been 
experiencing growth similar to Kingston throughout the late 1990s and early 2000s, but 
in 2005 they moved only 268,738 TEU compared to 435,200 TEU the previous year. 
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This represents a 38% decline in throughput in just one year. Rio Haina has been riddled 
by difficulties in congestion and productivity (McCalla et al 2005). The Dominican 
Republic has also developed the port of Caucedo, a greenfield project that was originally 
operated by CSX World Terminals, however, DP World recently purchased CSX World 
Terminals. They see Caucedo as a port in a strategic position internationally, and locally 
since it is located in a Free Trade Zone. Some see the potential of this port taking traffic 
away from Kingston (Ward 2003). 
3.4.5 Base ports 
The base of the transhipment triangle is the north coast of South America. The 
two ports of interest in the area are Puerto Cabello, Venezuela and Cartagena, Colombia. 
These ports have two strategic factors helping their transhipment goals. First, both ports 
are relatively close to trade routes. Cartagena is very close to the Panama Canal, and 
requires only a minor deviation from most major trade routes, whilst Puerto Cabello is 
relatively accessible to trade routes involving the east coast of South America. The 
second factor is the sizes of their populations. Colombia has three times the population 
and Venezuela twice the population of the Bahamas, Panama, Jamaica, Dominican 
Republic, and Trinidad and Tobago combined. Large markets act as a magnet to 
shipping lines, since they can serve the large domestic traffic and tranship at the same 
time. (McCalla et al 2005) 
Of the two, Cartagena has seen the most transhipment success, with 43% of its 
2006 traffic comprised of transhipment. Its throughput has expanded to 711,529 TEU in 
2006, which represented a 29.4% increase over 2005 levels, however, transhipment's 
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share has changed very little. Puerto Cabello, on the other hand, could only account for 
12% of its traffic as transhipment in 2006 (IPAPC 2007). Like Cartagena, Puerto Cabello 
has seen its port movements expand significantly. In 2006, it reported a throughput of 
844,220 TEU; a 36% increase from 2001 (IPAPC 2007) 
3.5 Conclusions 
The Caribbean Basin is a strategic location in international trade routes, with 
Panama acting as the axis of the region. Since relatively little domestic traffic is being 
generated in the region, the emphasis is being placed on transhipment. Many ports are 
building facilities to access the transhipment market. No single port has emerged as a 
'global hub.' The employed strategies seem to be quite similar. Port Authorities have 
emphasized privatization as a way to introduce international standards of best practice to 
compete for transhipment traffic, while typically placing the port within or nearby a Free 
Trade Zone to eliminate transaction costs associated with doing business in the port area. 
This summary points to the fact that several ports are competing for hub status and 
the two similarly located apex ports, Port of Port-of-Spain and Freeport Container 
Terminal have very different growth trends and it is suggested that governance has 
played a key role in explaining these differences. In the next chapter, these differences 




4.1 First impressions 
The site visits conducted in August 2003 clearly demonstrated the physical 
differences between the two ports. Freeport Container Port (FCP) is a modern facility 
that is highly organized and secure. The use of space has been rationalized and 
movements are tightly coordinated. It is located several kilometres from residential areas 
and only accessible by car. Its perimeter is well guarded by high fences and security 
personnel. The port area is well organized with plenty of space for handling operations. 
The visit to Port of Port-of-Spain (PPS) provided a sharp contrast. The site is 
surrounded by urban development and chaos. The approach to the port area required one 
to walk past the casual labourer area, which consisted of several unkempt buildings 
occupied by masses of 'port followers' hoping to be called to work. The entrance of the 
port area was adjacent to the new port authority building, which was modern and seemed 
out of place next to rusting tin-clad warehouses. The port area was congested and 
difficult to navigate between the many buildings and employees. It was clear the PPS's 
operations had their roots in an era before containerization. Processes were labour 
intensive. The site was littered with buildings that appeared to have been built over time 
in a piecemeal fashion. This is in sharp contrast to the modern facilities of Freeport 
which are marked by open spaces and machinery as opposed to warehouses and 
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labourers. These visits have left the author with a heightened appreciation of the 
circumstances surrounding the privatization movement in the developing world. 
4.2 Situation 
FCP is located on the Grand Bahama Island, which is one of the largest islands in 
the Commonwealth of the Bahamas. The port is located 105 kilometres from the east 
coast of Florida, USA, and is the closest significant offshore port to the USA 
(Woodbridge 1997). The port is located within a 230 square-mile free trade zone. The 
port possesses 1,036 meters of berthing space with a draught of 15.5 meters alongside the 
berths and 16 meters in the channel and turning basin, which makes FCP one of the 
deepest ports in the region (see figure 5.1). Ten super-post panamax quayside gantry 
cranes, 50 straddle carriers, and 49 hectares of stacking area, allow this port to act as a 
transhipment hub for the largest ships deployed today. The port operates 24-hours a day 
and possesses state-of-the-art communication and port management systems, while it 
only takes 45 minutes from pilot boarding to berthing (Woodbridge 1997). 
PPS is located on the north-western coast of the island of Trinidad and is seven 
kilometres off the eastern coast of Venezuela. PPS is a city port. It is located in the city 
center of the capital of Trinidad and Tobago, Port-of-Spain. The port area is surrounded 
by urban development. Due to its position, PPS's potential growth is constrained. 
Regardless of its inability to expand outwards, within PPS, berth space is also constrained 
due to its multi-cargo handling activities and passenger service. PPS only operates three 
dedicated container berths which range from 140 to 170 metres in length. These berths 
are equipped with three ship-to-shore gantry cranes, with 16.5 hectares of container 
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stacking area serviced by ten rubber tyred yard gantry cranes (PATNT 2007b). Several 
other berths in PPS are reserved for liquid bulk, dry bulk, ferry services, cruise ships, and 
several multi-purpose berths that may also handle containers with mobile cranes; and 
since 90% of the cargo handled in the port is containerized, it is puzzling to see so much 
of its limited space dedicated to other activities. 
PPS, a traditional city port, finds itself in a position where it has direct access to 
local markets (PPS handles 78% of the nation's domestic cargo), yet there are significant 
constraints on its expansion. PPS's ability to capitalize on its strategic position is 
hindered due to its difficult local site, since preset technological standards require larger 
areas for efficient cargo handling. This challenge is magnified by the reality that 
transhipment does not need to occur at ports with a hinterland at all, and are typically 
focused on international positions as opposed to local markets (Slack 1999). 
PPS has an additional challenge to overcome with its limited draught. A 
maximum draft of twelve metres alongside its berths renders PPS unable to handle the 
largest vessels currently deployed (see fig 5.1). This limitation is unlikely to change 
since the Orinoco River continually discharges large amounts of sediment towards the 
port. The low draft precludes PPS from the major transhipment trades. This reality is not 
lost on the management of PPS, as their stated goal is to become a regional 'sub-hub.' 
Their ship-to-shore equipment is a further limitation as PPS only possess three ship-to-
shore gantry cranes, two panamax and one post-panamax, thus limiting their throughput 
capacity. 
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figure 4.1 - Average port draughts in the selected Caribbean Basin ports 
Source: www.freeportcontianerport. com 
PPS's position is complicated further by the competition on its own coast. Point 
Lisas (PL) is located thirty kilometres south of PPS and its management has designs to 
overtake PPS as the nation's top container port. PL operates in the Point Lisas Industrial 
Port Development Corporation Ltd. (PLIPDECO), which is situated within an industrial 
park area away from residential areas of Trinidad. The organization operates the port and 
acts as the landlord to the industries operating within the area. PL has serviced the 
country's petro-chemical industry; however, management has its sights set on 
establishing the port as a container transhipment centre. The port is operating under the 
control of Captain Rawle Badaloo, who is an experienced seafarer and who was President 
of the Caribbean Shipping Association from 2000 - 2003, serving the maximum of 3 
terms in that position. Interestingly enough, during his tenure at the CSA, Point Lisas 
won the "Port of the Year" Award from 2001-2003 (CSA 2002). Capt. Badaloo's vision 
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is clearly in its infancy as the port is a skeleton operation. The facility is essentially a 
greenfield project as the port is simply a large paved area on which several mobile cranes 
perform the ship-to-shore operations. PL is also hindered by a limited draught, but they 
have ample room to expand and have been able to attract Maersk, which uses PL as their 
regional hub. 
4.3 Port development 
Container terminal development is another divergent aspect between PPS and 
FCP. The area and berthing space of PPS's container facility has not experienced 
significant change in the last decade. There were designs for expanding the container 
terminal to make berths seven and eight dedicated container facilities by the end of 2005, 
however, these plans were not implemented. All recent developments in the container 
handling side of the port have been retrofitting existing space and adding new equipment. 
For instance, PPS has expanded its container stacking space to 16.5 hectares, and 
purchased new rubber-tyred gantry cranes; however, these developments pale in 
comparison to the changes made at Freeport. 
FCP has developed in several stages (see fig 4.1), aided by Bahama Rock, a 
neighbouring concrete manufacturer, which has completed the excavation of the 
limestone bedrock in the port area to the exact specifications of the Port Authority at no 
charge since they have used the excavated limestone to produce construction aggregate. 
This project has been so lucrative for this firm that they have invested $40 million dollars 
in a new processing facility adjacent to the port. Stages I through IV have been 
completed, and three additional stages have been planned for future growth, which 
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includes up to 1,683 additional meters of berthing space and over 20 additional hectares 
of stacking area.3 
Figure 4.2 - FCP's long term development plan 
Picture 1: Present condition outlining remaining area to be excavated 
Picture 2: Future berthing line 
Picture 3: Computer generated image of FCP after completion of Stage VII 
Source: http://www.freeportcontainerport. com/fcp.php 
3
 An animated description of port development is available online : 
http://www.freeportcontainerport.com/fcp.plip 
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In addition, the Grand Bahama Port Authority is planning to develop 300 hectares 
of land between FCP and the Grand Bahama Airport, which has been dubbed the Sea Air 
Business Center (SABC). (see figure 5.3) This industrial park is designed to service 
logistic needs such as warehousing, distribution, transhipping and value-added 
manufacturing companies. The advantages of this scheme are the area being a free-trade 
zone, which reduces transaction costs since there are no taxes levied, and the large skilled 
work force that exists on the island since the decline in local tourism. 
figure 4.3 - Proposed SABC location 
741 Acre 
300 Hectares 
2,998.720 Sq. Meters 
i ft 
Source: http://www.freeportcontainerport. com/sabc.php 
4.4 Throughput 
Traffic has increased at both ports over the last decade, but it is evident that FCP 
has experienced the most success. Prior to the opening of the modern facility's phase I in 
1997, FCP routinely handled between 15,000 to 25,000 TEU per annum, which serviced 
the island's primarily importing needs. From 1997 to 2006, FCP's throughput had 
increased a dramatic 883% (see table 5.1). This growth has been due to an emphasis in 
transhipment both within the industry and in the port, as 98% its traffic is transhipped. 
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Traffic expansion has coincided directly with the completion of each new phase. There 
are dramatic increases in throughput in the years 2002 (Phase II) and 2006 (Phases III & 
IV), which resulted in a 58% increase in capacity (Woodbridge 2001). The expansion 
plans have been implemented based on demand and it is clear that each phase has 
approached its capacity before the introduction of additional facilities. Freeport can 
potentially have a capacity of 4 million TEU once all of the proposed expansions are 
complete (Fossey 2006b). 








































Source: ECLAC - http://www.eciac.cl/transporte/perfil/infopto.asp?num =35 
PPS, on the other hand, has always played an important role in Trinidad economy, 
serving as the major port to the island in the capital city. The port authority has been able 
to expect a certain level of traffic due to its hinterland, but internationally and regionally, 
PPS is not significant. Its 2005 throughput was ranked 142nd out of 360 ports in 
Containerization International's 'world container port traffic league', and PPS is not one 
of the top ten Caribbean ports. It is overshadowed by several basin ports, including its 
direct competitors Puerto Cabello and Cartagena. In the hopes of elevating its traffic, 
PPS targeted the transhipment market. The port authority contends that PPS has 
traditionally served as a natural transhipment centre, and nearly half of its throughput is 
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transhipment cargo; yet this still pales in comparison to the 98% transhipment reported at 
FCP. 
The overall traffic growth also pales in comparison to FCP (see table 5.2). 2004 
was PPS's most productive year, with a throughput 350,468 TEU, an 88.6% increase 
over its 1996 throughput. However, this rate of growth was average in the Caribbean. 
PPS has experienced fluctuations in its traffic since 1996. For example, its traffic 
decreased by 8% in 2005. 
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4.5 Factors affecting growth in Freeport 
The remarkable traffic growth can be explained by several factors: 
1. Growth in transhipment in the industry 
2. Strategic location 
3. USA Jones Act and cabotage by-pass 
4. Unique local policy and conditions 
5. Efficient and effective private operator 
6. Mediterranean Shipping Company 
FCP has been designed to cater to main line transhipment traffic, with its deep 
draught and excellent infrastructure. Due to its extensive berth, transhipment is often 
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from vessel to vessel, which saves shippers storage fees, reduces shipping times, and 
improves reliability4. In addition, the development of the SABC is intended to attract 
logistics companies and value-added operations, which is designed to further increase 
transhipment activity and develop FCP as an international multi-modal hub serving the 
North American East and Gulf coasts. 
FCP, has developed as a transhipment hub due in part to its international location. It 
is situated at the north-eastern apex of the Caribbean Basin Transhipment Triangle, and 
acts as an entry/exit point to the basin. Strategically located along several major trade 
routes, FCP can serve as a transhipment hub between the Eastern Gulf Coasts of the 
United States, the Gulf of Mexico, the Caribbean, South America, and trade lanes to 
European, Mediterranean, Far Eastern and Australasian destinations (see figure 5.3). 
A crucial advantage that FCP has utilized is its close proximity to the USA, and the 
inherent opportunity to circumvent the restrictive Jones Act, by acting as a cabotage by-
pass facility (Hoffmann 1998) for US bound cargo. Only American flagged ships, with 
American crews are permitted to run cabotage routes on American coasts. It is 
advantageous to tranship US-bound cargo at FCP onto US-flagged vessels to their final 
destinations instead of extensively operating costly US-flagged vessels in their fleets. 
Freeport has been able to under-cut its American rivals with lower port charges, lower 
transaction fees, and simplified bureaucracy. Major shipping companies eliminate the 
need to operate expensive American flagged vessels by utilizing FCP. American flagged 
feeder service providers, such as Colombia Coastal Transport, provide feeder connections 
to US ports, creating a niche market in global transhipment networks. 
4
 This information was provided by the port manager. 
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figure 4.3: Trade routes served by Freeport Container Terminal 
Source: http://www.freeportcontainerport. com/sabc.php 
FCP is also located in an area with a unique governance structure, and this has played 
a vital role in its development. FCP is located in a 230 square-mile Free Trade Zone. 
The governing body over this area is the Grand Bahama Port Authority Ltd (GBPA). The 
Bahamian governing structure is focused on the decentralization of power within the 
commonwealth in order to be more responsive to specific island needs. However, the 
GBPA is unique as it is a private entity that has been charged with the opportunity of 
developing most of the island, whilst retaining the burden of being profitable to its 
shareholders. This arrangement is found in the Hawksbill Creek Agreement (HCA), 
which was enacted in 1955. Within this document, and its subsequent amendments, one 
finds unique opportunities for private enterprise. 
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The HCA was designed to create the second largest urban center in the Bahamas for 
the 'economic benefit of the colony.' The document came into force after its signing on 
August 5, 1955. The HCA is an agreement between the Bahamian government and the 
GBP A, which was founded by Virginian financier Wallace Groves. The original 
agreement granted 50,000 acres to the GBP A, and through later acquisitions, the area of 
governance expanded three-fold to its present 230 square miles. The GBPA has been 
granted this land for a period of 99 years. In return for GBPA was charged with several 
tasks. The GBPA is responsible for the creation of a deep-water port, to spawn industrial 
and commercial development in the Freeport/Lucaya area and to exploit the natural 
resources of limestone and pine timber. The GBPA is also responsible for providing 
infrastructure such as roads, an airport, utilities (such as water, sewage, and electricity to 
CSA standards), schools, medical facilities, free government offices, and housing for 
government employees, whilst paying 25% of their wages. A later amendment demanded 
that the GBPA develop over 200 first-class resort rooms to increase tourism in the area. 
(Bahamian Government 1955) 
Additional benefits were bestowed upon the private GBPA. The Freeport/Lucaya 
area is exempt from customs/duties charges, personal income tax, and banking taxes. 
The exemption from personal income taxes is a Bahamas-wide policy; however, this is 
safeguarded in Freeport in the event that the central government were to change its 
policy. The exemption from customs/duty payments ends in the year 2015. This twenty-
two year extension was negotiated in 1993, shortly before the 1994 agreement between 
Hutchison Port Holdings, and the GBPA. The GBPA also has the authority to grant 
business licenses, dictate public planning, and carry out many legal actions without the 
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consent of the government. The GBPA also has the ability to recruit needed labour from 
abroad with expedited visa applications. (Bahamian Government 1955) 
The Freeport/Lucaya area is a private fiefdom with very little public-government 
oversight, and a private entity provides most services and all infrastructures. The GBPA 
is able to dictate its own destiny with minimal interference from the government; 
however, it also holds the responsibility of providing public goods. The GBPA occupies 
a strange position as a quasi-governmental authority with private business ethics. 
Freeport fits into HPH's Group Managing Director, Mr. John E. Meredith stated 
preference that HPH likes "...to be involved where there is no government port 
operation, because if there is, we would have a conflict of interest. We (HPH) like areas 
where the government has backed off, and we can do our own thing..." (Dekker 2006) 
It is under these business-friendly conditions that Hutchison Port Holdings (HPH) 
decided to invest in a pure transhipment facility. HPH was established in 1994 as a 
subsidiary to Hutchison Whampoa Ltd., which is a giant multi-national corporation based 
in Hong Kong that has interests in telecommunications, real estate and retailing. The 
company was created to manage the company's rapidly expanding container port 
portfolio. Hutchison Whampoa Ltd. is the result of a 1970 merger between the British 
"hong" trading house John D. Hutchison and Company, which was founded in the late 
19th century (the first company registered in Hong Kong) and the Hongkong & Whampoa 
Dock Company, which was founded in 1866. Hutchison Whampoa Ltd is a container 
handling pioneer in Asia and has become the leader in container terminal operations 
(Airiess 2001). Prior to the creation of HPH, its parent company, Hutchison Whampoa, 
had operated terminals in the port of Hong Kong and it began to expand its operations 
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beyond Hong Kong in the early 1990s. At its creation in 1994, Hutchison ports handled 
8.4 million TEU annually; and by 2006, HPH's worldwide throughput reached 59.3 
million TEU, which is a 606% increase in twelve years. Hutchison has grown from 
operating a handful of berths in Hong Kong to operating 257 berths in 45 ports in 21 
different countries on five continents in less than 20 years. 
The investment in the hinterland-poor yet transhipment-potential-rich Freeport was 
made even though Meredith has also publicly stated that "As a private investor, I am not 
in favour of the private sector putting money into transhipment ports. It is far, far too 
risky" (Cross 2000). Locally derived traffic in Freeport rarely exceeded 25,000 TEU 
prior to HPH's investment. However, Freeport offered a unique opportunity for the 
transnational port operator since it only required a low degree of financial risk and 
presented a unique geographic position and governance structure. The harbour was 
excavated for free by Bahama Rock and all HPH had to complete was the surfacing work 
and the installation of superstructures to become operational in 1997 (Cross 2000). An 
additional incentive is the potential to produce a modern logistics center that could 
capture American traffic, along with the lack of development restrictions and taxes also 
weighed heavily in HPH's assessment. 
The deal to bring HPH into Freeport developed out of HPH's purchase of Felixstowe, 
UK. GBPA was a shareholder in the port of Felixstowe before its sale to HPH. A GBPA 
board member was touring the facilities at Felixstowe, and had simply mentioned that he 
was impressed and that he would like to see similar operations in Freeport. HPH 
surveyed the Freeport site shortly thereafter, and negotiations began between HPH and 
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GBPA. The conclusion of these negotiations resulted in HPH purchasing a 45% share of 
the GBPA, including control over non-port investments such as hotels, the airport, and 
the track of land between the port and the airport for the SABC, which required an initial 
investment of 700 million USD.6 For the local population, the investment made by HPH 
was promising and surprising news. Prior attempts by other parties to invest in the 
GBPA were routinely denied. The shareholders of the GBPA were unwilling to concede 
any control over its unique arrangement. The new investment presented new 
opportunities for the local population. 1600 jobs had been lost in Freeport due to a 
decline in tourism. By 2003, nearly 500 of those jobs were recovered in the port alone, 
while HPH reinvested in the tourism industry, thus creating more jobs.7 
It is under these circumstances that the Mediterranean Shipping Company (MSC) has 
decided to use Freeport's strategic position as an important hub in its network. In 2003, 
MSC was responsible for 80% of the port's traffic, while Maersk was responsible for 
19% of its throughput.8 However, by 2004, Maersk had pulled out of FCP (Fossey 
2006b). 98%o of FCP's throughput is transhipped and 99% of MSC's cargo is transhipped 
at Freeport (Fossey 2006b). The massive amount of transhipment would suggest that an 
extensive hub and spoke network has developed, however, that does not appear to be the 
case. Only a very small portion of the traffic involves feeder services, however, the 
majority of the transhipment occurs between MSC's mother-vessels and it does not 
5
 This story was taken from an interview with port manager Mr. Jones in August 2003 
6
 These figures were obtained during interviews with the President of the Freeport Chamber of Commerce, 
Mercynth Ferguson, and port manager Mr. Jones in August 2003. 
7
 This information was obtained via the interview the President of the Freeport Chamber of Commerce, 
Mercynth Ferguson. 
8
 These figures were obtained during an interview with Mr. Jones - FCP port manager - in August 2003. 
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operate any feeder vessels through Freeport, whilst the local carriers of Colombia and 
Tropical do not have the capacity to facilitate such cargo loads.9 This corresponds with 
Fremont's (2007) model of convergence on mainline routes. 
Freeport can act as a pure convergence-transhipment-hub as it is situated at the 
intersection of multiple east-west and north-south trade routes and requires very little 
deviation for vessels along these routes. Additional feeder services are employed, but the 
role of pure feeder vessels are secondary. In addition to its strategic location, Freeport is 
also a port that MSC has been able to dominate since it is 'secondary' on a global scale, 
and is devoid of any shipping legacy which also fits into Freemont's (2007) model. He 
argues that Maersk has employed a strategy of entering into historically little used ports 
and transforming them into significant 'secondary' ports in a very short period of time. 
Salalah and Algericas are considered to be "Maersk ports" and most of its traffic and all 
of its transhipment is dependant on Maersk. MSC too seeks to dominate a few major 
hubs such as Valencia and Antwerp, along with Freeport. Having this type of control 
over a port's traffic allows the carrier to have greater influence over the port itself and 
allows greater flexibility since through FCP, MSC can serve a wide variety of markets, 
deploy ships of different capacities to serve specific markets, and offer customers an 
extensive choice of services across the world. 
4.6 Factors affecting growth in Port-of-Spain 
PPS, as Freeport, finds itself in a strategic geographical position, however, its 
local conditions are remarkably different. PPS is situated in the south-eastern apex of the 
Caribbean transhipment triangle. The port is at the crossroads of many international 
9
 Shipping route data obtained from Containerisation International Yearbook 2005 
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shipping routes that serve the east and north coasts of South America from destinations 
such as Europe, the gulf and east coasts of North America, as well as Asia and Africa. 
These routes are not as important as those served by FCP and hence there are fewer 
containers to capture. Compounding this issue is the high level of competition that exists 
for this traffic. Puerto Cabello charges very little for transhipment traffic, while Colon 
and Cartagena also serve as hubs for the same traffic routes. The north-south trade can 
call at any hub in the entire Caribbean Basin. Furthermore, PPS has competition on its 
own island. 
Point Lisas has been able to attract some carriers to its ports, most notably 
Maersk. The port handled 98,368 TEU in 2003, which represented a 170% increase over 
its 1998 throughput, and had grown further to 131,750 TEU in 2004 and 145,246 TEU in 
2005. It is reasonable to suggest that some of this growth came at the expense of PPS, 
since PPS handled 28,002 fewer TEU in 2005 than 2004. 
Despite the competition, the primary issue that has constrained the throughput of 
PPS is its operations. PPS has been trying to compete in the container-handling industry 
from a position of weakness. Its facilities are small and congested. Its labour practices 
are intensive and out-dated, with over 700 registered unionized staff and 500 casual 
labourers called 'port followers' (CSA 2003). Productivity suffered due to these issues, 
and PPS averaged a mere eight crane moves per hour in 2005 (PATNT 2007a). The Port 
Authority has been attempting to ameliorate these issues for several years with limited 
success. The Port Authority has restructured their responsibilities in order to privatize 
the container handling operations of the port and thus modernize and rationalize 
operations. 
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The restructuring process at PPS has been difficult and has seen several revisions. 
As will be seen in the following chapter, PPS first employed a commercialization process 
that divided the many functions of the Port Authority. A private terminal operator was 
initially sought to enter into a joint venture. Debt was cancelled and the government 
invested in new infrastructure to make the port more attractive to a potential partner. 
However, PPS was unwilling to enact labour reform and efficiency did not see any 
significant change despite the investment in new technology. PPS was unable to find an 
offer deemed acceptable by the government and changed its strategy, which culminated 
in a management contract in 2006 with Portia Ltd. The port is beginning to see 
improvements in productivity (12 crane moves an hour) and labour reform is being 





The move towards privatization employed by PPS and FCP are remarkably 
different. Both ports are atypical examples of port privatizations and each is situated at 
either end of the privatization spectrum - PPS representing a situation with very little 
private participation and FCP representing a private empire. The disparity in governance 
structures has affected the success of each port. 
5.2 The case of Port of Port-of-Spain 
PPS is part of the portfolio of the Port Authority of Trinidad and Tobago (PATNT). 
The PATNT was established in 1962 as a public institution to act as the authority over the 
Port of Port-of-Spain in Trinidad and the Port of Scarborough in Tobago, while 
remaining under the control of the central government, and can thus be classified a 
service or PUBLIC port. In 1993, the PATNT commenced work on a restructuring plan. 
Nine-years later the restructuring strategy was finalized and approved by the cabinet. 
The restructuring plan had two main components - the division of responsibilities and 
activities into smaller companies via the process of commercialization, as a precursor to 
the ultimate goal of privatizing the new cargo handling unit by means of a joint venture 
with an international port operator willing to invest in the port. Instituting market forces 
on the container port's operations and the elimination of cross-subsidization were 
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primary goals of this commercialization; however, the central objective was to find a 
partner to help finance a modernization of the container facilities while also rationalizing 
the work force, thus lowering transportation costs and potentially capturing larger 
volumes of transhipment traffic, thus improving the local economy through a multiplier 
effect. 
Unfortunately, by the time the restructuring plan was approved in late 2002, 
transhipment was a saturated industry in the Caribbean Basin. Competing ports, such as 
Freeport, Colon and Kingston had already oriented their operations. This bureaucratic 
delay had weakened the position of PPS within the industry, even though it occupied a 
natural transhipment position in the Caribbean Basin. 
Nevertheless, PATNT continued to implement a commercialization process and 
divided its responsibilities into five units/companies - Cargo Handling, Cruise Shipping, 
Ferry Services, Real Estate Management, and Marine Services (such as pilotage and tugs) 
(Baird 2000a). A joint venture with an international port operator was the arrangement of 
choice for the government of Trinidad and Tobago. The proposed joint venture would 
involve the creation of a limited liability cargo-handling corporation which would have 
created a PUBLIC/private port under the Port Function Privatization Matrix, with the 
government retaining a 49% stake while the partner would obtain a 51% controlling 
interest in cargo handling division (CSA 2003). The port authority would retain 
ownership of the other business units as well, thus the port authority would act as a 
landlord and regulator, while maintaining an ownership position in the port operator 
function. The proposed ownership structure would allow the port authority to maintain 
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a dominant position whilst benefiting from the new direct foreign investment and the 
improved operations via world-class management. 
Requests for proposals from international port operators were issued at the beginning 
of 2003. To make the potential investment more attractive, PPS began to upgrade 
facilities and cancelled debt via an equity swapping scheme which cleared TT$2.7 billion 
in debt from the books of PATNT at a cost to the taxpayers (CSA 2003). The new 
business structure, along with the large debt reduction and improved facilities were still 
not enough to attract any acceptable bids. It was reported that a bid from ICTSI was 
given serious consideration, however, by January 2004, Transportation Minister Franklin 
Khan had publicly declared that all three of the received offers were too low (CSA 2004). 
The government continued to accept tenders, and engaged in negotiations with a 
promising bidder early in 2005, however, once again PPS was unable to find a deal that 
the government could accept (CSA 2005b). 
Unsuccessful in their previous two searches for a joint venture partner, the 
government decided to change strategies and began to seek an international port operator 
to run the cargo handling function under a management contract. It was within this 
context that the government of Trinidad & Tobago decided to announce in August of 
2005 that they had designs on creating a new port in the Sea Lots area of Port-of-Spain, 
which would eventually replace PPS as the main container facility on the island. The 
proposed facility would cost US$240 million and would provide the island with a state-
of-the-art facility and improved land links, yet there were no timelines indicated, and this 
new facility would negate the recent investments in upgrading the facilities at PPS and 
the massive debt reduction incurred by the government (CSA 2005a). Whether this 
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announcement was merely a negotiation tactic or an actual project is unknown as the 
author is unable to find any further reports on the subject. 
Regardless, the shift in strategy bore fruit. Four proposals were received by August 
of 2005. Negotiations between the government and the preferred management operator, 
Portia Management Services10, took place from November 14th to 18th 2005. These 
negotiations culminated with a signed agreement between the two parties on March 14, 
2006 (CSA 2006). Portia will manage the port for an initial period of three years and will 
be compensated USD 1.335 million plus bonuses per annum. Portia has assigned 
twelve professional staff members as an executive management team, however, it must 
be noted that Portia is not investing its money in the port (Portia Management 2007). 
The stated goals of this contract are for Portia to bring effective management, best 
operating practices, and increased safety (PATNT 2007b). Embedded within these goals 
is a rationalization of operations, which is highlighted by labour reform. The port, now 
managed by Portia, is in negotiations with the Seamen and Waterfront Workers Trade 
Union to create a Voluntary Separation Package to reduce the workforce and it appears 
that the union is aware of the inevitability of this change (PATNT 2007a). 
In the end, the ownership structure of PPS did not alter past the commercialization 
process, which itself is not considered privatization by the traditional UNCTAD 
definition, which stipulates that there needs to be either a transfer of ownership to, or 
investment from, the private sector. Using Cullinane & Song's (2001) second definition 
of port privatization - "the 'privatization' of the production of a service that continues to 
be financed by the public sector" - PPS went from operating as a PUBLIC port to a 
10
 Portia Management Services is the international arm of the UK based Mersey Dock and Harbour 
Company. They were pioneers in the present privatization phenomenon that started in the UK in the 1980s. 
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PUBLIC/private port- with a private actor participating in the port operator function in 
partnership with the public sector, while the public sector continues to provide the 
regulator and landowner functions. Trinidad was able to meet many of its privatization 
objectives through this arrangement, such as improved management, the rationalization 
of labour, with a greater emphasis on market forces in the port's operations. As a result, 
port charges have decreased, and it is the passage of time will determine whether this has 
a positive effect on the economy, but there was one objective that this agreement did not 
satisfy, which was the infusion of direct foreign investment to help modernize the facility 
without taxpayer's money. This burden rests with either the port financing capital 
expenditures independently or the continued dependence on public funds. 
5.2.1 Institutional barriers to privatization 
The experience of Trinidad raises the question - why was it unable to find a partner 
willing to invest in the port at a level acceptable to the government? Part of the answer 
rests in the institutional position of the port and how this may have led to an over-
valuation by the government and/or lower bids due to a high risk assessments made by 
the interested firms. PPS did not address its out-dated labour practices prior to 
privatization, and it was clear that the port remained a high-profile local political issue. 
In addition, the proposed PUBLIC/private privatization scheme required that the private 
operator to enter into this joint venture (requiring millions of dollars in investment) in a 
subordinate position with a Trinidadian government, which had taken the greater part of a 
decade to merely finalize a restructuring strategy, and still had a controlling interest in a 
rival port on the same coast line only thirty kilometres away. All of these inter-related 
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factors were clearly detrimental to the willingness of the private actors to invest millions 
of dollars in this "regional sub-hub." 
The labour situation at PPS was clearly a problem. The port employs over 700 
unionized workers as well as 500 casual workers. The port is one of the largest 
employers in the city, and layoffs with the spectre of ensuing civil unrest were on the 
minds of those controlling the restructuring process. A high level of port employment 
can be contributed to The Monumental Syndrome (Goss 1990c). The port can act as 
means of visible public spending for the government in a nation with serious poverty 
issues. Providing more people with decent jobs can help legitimize a government, and 
any change to commercialization would end this aspect of the port. This would not be 
welcome news to many citizens despite all the negative consequences of having an 
inefficient port raising prices and/or draining public treasuries. Any prospective partner 
would be extremely wary of a port with such a legacy and their bids would certainly 
reflect these concerns. Furthermore, Trinidad's unwillingness to enact pre-privatization 
labour reform was in opposition to the recommendations of organizations such as the UN 
and the World Bank which suggest that labour reform should be completed prior to any 
port privatization and privatization must not be seen as a means to this end. The Trinidad 
government, however, was clearly looking for someone else to undertake this unenviable 
task. 
The politicization of the port area is certainly evident beyond the labour issues. The 
speed of the restructuring process would be unacceptable in a commercial organization. 
The process began in 1993 and culminated with the consolation of a three-year 
management contract in 2006. Such displays of decisiveness and swiftness are usually 
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not attractive in a potential business partner. The elimination of bureaucratic interference 
is often cited as a motive to privatize a port, as well as a detriment to the privatization 
process. In the case of PPS, bureaucracy served as an obstacle and was to remain after 
privatization. 
Differing perspectives of value also likely contributed to PPS's privatization 
complexities. The perspective of the government is that the port is a key part of the 
country's economy - as a source of income, a significant transportation node, and a major 
employer. The government thus views the port as an important national asset. The 
government's assessed value of this asset has been influenced by its local importance, 
whereas private operators assess the port's value within a global framework, which 
recognizes the significant competition along the served trade routes, relatively low 
throughput, the poor condition of the port, poor productivity in the port, labour issues, 
along with the legacy of debt, bureaucracy, and politicization. These issues each 
represent risks to a potential partner and likely led to lower bids that were deemed 
unacceptable by the government. 
A further problem that potential partners surely recognized was the duplication of 
services along PPS's shore. PPS faces stiff international competition, but Point Lisas 
represented a threat closer to home, and that threat was compounded by the ownership 
structures in the two ports. Point Lisas is a PUBLIC/private port. PLIPDECO 
ownership is 51% in the hands of the government of Trinidad and Tobago and 49% in the 
hands of private shareholders. The government had designs on owning 49% of PPS, and 
this leads to ambiguity since the government would have significant ownership in two 
competing ports, including a controlling interest in the competition. The Port of Port-of-
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Spain even had a full colour advertisement in Point Lisas' 2001 handbook (pg 20). It is 
extremely rare to find a company willing to publish the advertising of a competitor in its 
own promotional material; however, this is the reality in Trinidad. This leads one to 
wonder where one operation ends and the other begins. Muddled relations such as these 
can be a significant risk to a private actor. 
The difficulties in this privatization process stem from the inherent institutional 
constructs surrounding the deal. The Trinidadian government was less concerned with 
privatizing and more concerned with improving its operations and reaping the economic 
benefits of a more efficient port. The cost of improving the infrastructure and operating 
the port was secondary; otherwise they would have been more earnest in positioning the 
institutional structure of the port to favour privatization beyond the debt elimination. Its 
mission statement illustrates their priorities quite succinctly. The opening portion reads 
as follows: "To become the most attractive, efficient, customer-oriented port in the 
region, to achieve and maintain financial self-sufficiency and to be exemplars of 
corporate performance in facilitating the achievement of national aspirations." (PATNT 
2007b) 
The first stated motive is to become internationally competitive. Recognizing that the 
port authority did not posses the ability to neither effectively manage the port nor execute 
the unpopular decisions necessary to achieve that aim, the private sector was seen as the 
means to this end. The second motive is to maintain financial self-sufficiency, which 
harks to the common motive of reconceptualizing a port as a business that makes money, 
or at least breaks even, rather than a public service which requires public funds to operate 
and thus a burden on the tax payer. The government clearly saw that the resources 
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devoted to the port would be more beneficial to society elsewhere. If and when a partner 
could be secured to operate the port in a profitable manner, the port would then no longer 
be a burden on the tax payers. Both of these motives have been catalysts to the 
international port privatization phenomenon, and if the mission statement were finished 
after these two phrases, the privatization process would have been more straightforward. 
It is the last motive from this statement that is problematic for international port operators 
- ".. .facilitating the achievement of national aspirations." 
Transnational terminal operators operate ports to make a profit. National aspirations 
may be contrary to such an end. The Trinidadian government remains committed to the 
port's role in society. It recognizes the need to improve, yet it still views the port as 
socially and politically important. This emphasis contrasts the privatization efforts of 
others where the port has been available to the highest bidder, which is favoured by 
international port operators. Trinidad, on the other hand, wanted to make the prospective 
partner the one responsible for carrying out policy, which isn't typically part of the 
portfolio of a private actor. In other words, Trinidad was asking potential partners to 
make significant investments to rehabilitate a poor site, reform a money-losing operation 
into a profitable one, while conducting labour reform and fulfilling national aspirations. 
That is a lot to ask of a government, let alone a business. Port operators are able to 
operate ports, not solve local political issues. 
Trinidad needed to create a situation where the new port operator would be part of 
well formulated policy directive, where the task was to operate the port efficiently and 
improve facilities, and any political, economic or social benefit would occur indirectly 
through a multiplier effect. The Trinidadian government instead created a situation 
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where the operator had to enter into business with the government and its layers of 
bureaucracy, whom was also their closest competitor, while instituting unpopular labour 
reform and implementing policy. This is clearly not ideal for any business, nevertheless, 
there was money to be made and bids were received. The bids, however, were not at the 
level expected by the government, and this was a function of the institutional 
circumstances surrounding the deal and the government's over-estimation of the value of 
the port on the open market. 
Trinidad's rejection of joint venture bids and its subsequent acceptance of a 
management contract demonstrate the government's priorities. It is looking for a partner 
to bring international standards of best practice, ideally with millions of dollars to invest 
and the willingness to do its dirty work. It was also not eager to relinquish neither control 
nor ownership of this important national asset. The end result was a deal that represents a 
compromise between the desires of Trinidadian government and its apprehensions - a 
short-term private management contract. They have found the expertise but without the 
millions to invest and at an annual price of 1.335 million USD plus bonuses. 
5.3 The case of Freeport 
Freeport's privatization experience is at the opposite end of the port privatization 
spectrum. Whereas PPS remains firmly in the hands of the public, Freeport is a wholly 
privatized port. Under the Port Functions Privatization Matrix, Freeport is a textbook 
example of a PRIVATE port, as the GBPA is a private body that performs the functions 
of landowner, port operator, as well as regulator. It is rare that a private company can 
have such depth of control, with the UK being the only other prominent example in the 
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container port industry. Typically a private port operator that functions as the regulator 
only regulates its port and whatever adjacent property it may own. The GBP A, however, 
is quite different as it is an autonomous body that is responsible for a number of services 
that are usually governed by the public sector and apply this power to a vast area well 
beyond its port facilities, which is seldom seen in the portfolio of public port authorities, 
let alone private actors. Its control over its jurisdiction is safeguarded until 2054, the end 
of the Hawksbill Creek Agreement period, which would be considered abnormally long 
by present standards. 
HPH found itself in a unique position with this project, since it did not need to 
negotiate with public figures. Those negotiations were completed almost 40 years prior 
to their involvement in Freeport, with the exception of the extension of the duty 
exemptions negotiated in 1993 between the GBPA and the Bahamian government. The 
subsequent 1994 deal between HPH and the GBPA was a pure business deal rather than a 
port privatization, lacking the intricacies and political difficulties that can exist in the 
process of taking a previously public entity and including private actors. Also, HPH did 
not have to enter public tenders nor face competition. Strictly speaking, HPH's 
involvement cannot be classified as privatization since there was not a transfer of 
ownership from the public to the private sector, or new private investment in a previously 
public port. The privatization of Freeport occurred 40-years prior with the signing of the 
Hawksbill Creek Agreement (HCA). 
Examining the HCA as a port privatization presents interesting deviations from 
contemporary port privatization literature, with some important similarities. The most 
exceptional divergence is the depth of the privatization that is applied to such a large 
76 
area. The most common model of port administration employed around the world is the 
PUBLIC/private approach, where the public sector retains the regulator and landowner 
functions within the port, while the private sector operates the facilities. In Freeport, 
being a PRIVATE port, the public sector is essentially absent not only in port 
administration, but also in the surrounding community. The public sector role has been 
limited to security in the form of police, justice, and customs services, which are 
necessary for any port be it public or private. All economic considerations for the port 
and the surrounding area are regulated by the GBP A. Presently nations are not willing to 
cede direct economic control over such a vast expanse of its territory. 
A further deviation of the HCA in comparison to contemporary privatization 
schemes is the compensation delivered to the government that ceded control. The HCA 
required very little from the GBPA for its concession, which is remarkably different to 
contemporary situations. The HCA 'denationalized' the Freeport/Lucaya area under a 
Build-Own-Operate-Transfer (BOOT) agreement with an envious term of 99 years; 
considering the present industry standard is 20 to 30 years for such agreements. 
Possessing an enormous time frame, HPH has the luxury of patience in realizing returns 
on their investment. This advantage can be employed in many ways, one being lower 
port charges, which has been to the chagrin of competing ports trying to match FCP's 
rates that have been reported to be as low as $25 for transhipped containers.11 The HCA 
inadvertently created a remarkable template for container transhipping success well 
before container shipping was even invented, let alone the vast application of container 
transhipment. HPH is reaping the rewards of unforeseen economic benefits sewn 40 
11
 This figure was obtained from an interview with Cpt. Badaloo, former President of the Caribbean 
Shipping Association in August of 2003 in Trinidad. 
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years prior to its involvement. A similar agreement is inconceivable in the present 
market. 
The one aspect of the HCA that is congruous with present port privatization literature 
is its motives. The HCA clearly stipulates that the purpose of the agreement is to develop 
the economy of the Grand Bahama Island, which ostensibly reduced the pressures on the 
1955 public coffers. The central theme of this agreement is to develop a deep-water 
harbour to act as the catalyst to economic development through international trade. The 
deal with HPH is a logical extension of this motive. The incentives built into the HCA of 
no taxes and the elimination of duties on much of the international trade within the region 
certainly attracted HPH to this port, and in turn HPH hopes that these incentives will 
attract transhipment related industries to their SABC. The present level of international 
trade passing through the port must clearly be beyond the expectations of the politicians 
that drafted this legislation. 
Also stipulated within the agreement is a clause to exploit the natural resources of the 
area, particularly limestone and pine timber. The dredging of the deep-water port was 
also a harvesting of the limestone. In essence the construction of FCP satisfied two main 
objectives of this privatization scheme, a successful deep-water port and natural resource 
exploitation, even if it was not completed in a timely manner. 
These HCA objectives, however, were not the catalyst for the partnership between 
the GBPA and HPH. The motives are purely business related. The local port serviced 
local needs sufficiently. Much of the port privatization literature focuses on the 
economic benefits for local industries and businesses from an efficient port, but such 
motives are lost in this example. This deal was brokered to serve globalizing forces and 
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capture the potential profits inherent in transhipment business for the benefit of the 
GBPA shareholders. The GBPA was not actively searching for new port operators, nor 
new business partners. This is evident by their exclusionary practices when courted by 
interested investors. The deal between HPH and the GBPA is an outcome of globalizing 
forces producing a new opportunity for this locality. Any local benefits are positive 
externalities of this world-class facility. 
5.3.1 The role of a private port authority 
As a port authority, the GBPA has several ongoing issues that it must address, and its 
ability to handle these issues will be demonstrative for those dealing with the arguments 
for and against public port authorities. The three main issues that all port authorities must 
address are port planning and physical issues, trade and shipping, as well as the role of 
various actors in the port community. In the case of port planning and physical issues, it 
has been theorized that the public sector would perform better than the private sector 
(Goss 1990a). The GBPA, in partnership with HPH, is properly coordinating their 
investments with a logical and ambitious plan in place with FCP and the SABC. 
Economically, Freeport/Lucaya has very few resources. The region has always been 
service orientated with tourism and banking being major industries, however, the 
downturn in tourism can be explained as an example of poor management. HPH 
represents a new strategy of growth for the future of Freeport. The effectiveness of its 
initiatives is yet to be determined. Regardless, The GBPA and HPH are also clearly 
benefiting from the absence of bureaucratic red tape with these initiatives, which has 
been one of the main arguments against public port authorities (Cullinane & Song 2001) 
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Additional concerns relate to exclusion and externalities. How the GBP A deals with 
accessibility as well as environmental and aesthetic issues will serve to illustrate the 
potential of private management of public spaces, or serve as an example of the private 
sector's failure to address these issues. A positive example in Freeport is the accessibility 
of its facilities to all port users. This has been a central concern with private management 
in the literature, since certain port users could potentially be excluded in favour of more 
profitable customers. FCP services the larger ships, whilst the adjacent original Freeport 
harbour is available to smaller vessels, thus rendering the port extremely accessible. 
A negative consequence of the region's private authority is the GBPA's aesthetic 
strategy of segregation. The tourism facilities are separate from local dwellings, 
industries and the many shells of incomplete constructions that are scattered throughout 
the area, and show the everyday circumstances that exist for local residents who do not 
reside in the resort and airport areas. Freeport/Lucaya is a community of contrasts and 
simularca, which tells a story of neglect and exploitation as opposed to pina coladas and 
relaxation. 
The environmental impacts of its port construction and corresponding industries are 
also genuine concerns. The HCA was written over a decade before the first popular 
modern environmental movements began and such concerns are correspondingly absent. 
There is no mention of environmental protocol in the HCA and it is unclear whether the 
Bahamian government has the power to provide oversight for such circumstances. 
The second on-going issue, the management of international trade and shipping, has 
become the most important aspect of the GBPA's portfolio. This is evident in the 
changes of throughput and the development of the SABC. Albeit more subtle, the roles 
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of various actors may become the most decisive factor for future growth of the SABC 
and port throughput as well as economic development in the Freeport/Lucaya area. 
The position of the GBPA is certainly unique and represents a situation of great 
political ambiguity. The present chairman of the GBPA, Mr. Babak, has acknowledged 
this problem and has vowed to make the private corporation/local authority more 
accountable (Dames 2006). This issue is compounded by the reality that the GBPA is not 
a publicly traded company and thus not required to publish its business activities. The 
position of the GBPA as a public authority with business interests, could have a negative 
affect on attracting invest in Freeport, especially those that might wish to compete with 
businesses already owned by the GBPA or its members. The GBPA should identify its 
core businesses, most notably cargo handling and utilities, and focus on these while 
eliminating other business concerns to show potential investors that they will be 
operating on a level playing field; otherwise it may be perceived as too risky to invest in 
Freeport and its SABC. 
From the perspective of HPH, it can be assumed that its position is tempered by 
extremely competitive external market forces, and it is imperative to its success that 
Freeport appears as an excellent place to invest, in order to develop a maritime cluster in 
Freeport, similar to what has developed in Panama (HPH's other major investment in the 
Caribbean Basin), which would strengthen FCP's position as a transhipment hub. FCP's 
main concern is losing traffic to competing ports in Jamaica, Dominican Republic, Puerto 
Rico, USA, and potentially Cuba. They can ill afford to play games with potential 
investors if they wish for their site to remain competitive. Within this last sentence lays 
one of the keys to Freeport's success, its global outlook. 
81 
Its operations are purely commercial and are responsive to the industry, whereas 
many private companies find themselves operating ports which are conceptualized by 
politicians as a local concern first and a global position second. Local political pressures 
are essentially absent from FCP's mandate and this should be attractive to other 
businesses, as long as they are able to clarify the position of the GBPA. 
The outcomes of all these issues will certainly provide excellent fodder for the port 
privatization debate, as HPH demonstrates the ability of the private sector to manage total 
control of its port and surrounding area. 
5.4 Conclusions 
The case studies of Freeport, Bahamas and Port of Port-of-Spain, Trinidad 
demonstrate two extremes in the privatization phenomenon that has swept the container 
handling industry. There are significant disparities in motivations, process and the 
resulting success at each port. 
PPS had attempted to replicate the common PUBLIC/private arrangement via a joint 
venture, but they experienced many difficulties along the way and settled for a 
management contract which represents the least amount of private participation discussed 
in the literature. Freeport, on the other hand, is a completely PRIVATE port and more. 
The Grand Bahama Port Authority, a wholly private entity, acts as the terminal operator, 
landowner and regulator; along with the responsibility of being the local government. 
The different levels of privatization between the two ports has been the result of differing 
government policies. 
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PPS is viewed as a significant national asset by the government. They view the port 
as an important part of the national economy and an even more important part of the local 
economy and were not eager to cede complete control. PPS demonstrated many of the 
arguments against public port authorities, such as the constraints of bureaucracy and the 
countless delays experienced at PPS while the government decided what to do. The 
Caribbean transhipment market became very competitive during the dithering, thus 
limiting PPS's inherent geographical advantage. 
Trinidad's rejection of joint venture bids and subsequent acceptance of a management 
contract demonstrate its intentions. They were looking for a partner to bring international 
standards of best practice and ideally millions of dollars to invest, while reluctant to 
relinquish all control. The end result was a deal that represents a compromise between 
the desires of Trinidadian government and their apprehensions - a short-term private 
management contract. They have found the expertise but without the millions to invest 
and at a price of 1.335 million USD plus bonuses annually. The case of PPS is a 
testament to local politics unwillingness to succumb to international commercial 
interests. Although PPS's pre-privatization conditions are not unique, their resistance to 
accept the market value for their asset and their decision to further invest in their 
infrastructure rather than relinquish control to multi-national corporations were. They 
were able to achieve some of their goals - most notably improved management and 
labour reform - yet were unable to find a company willing to invest. 
FCP, on the other hand, is simply viewed as a commercial enterprise by all levels of 
government, and this is unique due to the 1955 Hawksbill Creek Agreement. As a result, 
FCP developed quickly due to the self-determination granted via the HCA. Furthermore, 
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the extensive depth of the privatization and its application to such a vast region with 
many varied functions and for such an abnormally long term, presents a unique situation 
in the industry which is doubtful to be replicated. The Hawksbill Agreement is from a 
different era and the advantages for shipping are being realized fifty years after its 
inception. Hutchison Port Holdings has been able to capitalize on this unique 
institutional position and has experienced remarkable growth. 
The Freeport business model is a private fantasy, while PPS is a political 
institution that was seeking a private actor to become the catalyst of change in a small 
troubled port. In an industry that has exploded with opportunity for international terminal 
operators, it is clear to see why a leading firm, in HPH, was willing to divert from its 
usual investment criteria of a strong hinterland and invest in a pure transhipment facility 
in Freeport, whereas the opportunity to invest in a port with a much stronger hinterland at 
PPS was passed over. The end result is that FCP was able to successfully build upon a 
piece of legislation that wildly favoured private enterprise, whereas PPS was constrained 
due to its institutional position. FCP was able to attract clients quickly and respond to 
their needs without political interference and the port is a success story as a result of these 
conditions. PPS has been hindered by the government's conceptualization of the port and 
modernization and growth has stagnated. It has suffered in the hands of an indecisive 
government which has limited the ability of the port to adapt to the changing market. 




6.1 Study Findings 
Port governance, in particular privatization, plays a major role in shaping port 
performance. By selecting the two ports of FCP and PPS, which each possess 
comparable geographical characteristics as potential transhipment centres, differences in 
performance may be linked to differences in the extent of privatization. Each port is 
strategically positioned in the basin and has had equal opportunity to succeed. 
Furthermore, restructuring efforts were initiated at both ports in 1993. By 2007 two very 
different stories had transpired. Freeport's traffic had exploded while Port-of-Spain's has 
grown at the similar rate to the basin. 
What factors have created this disparity? Freeport serves the most important trade 
routes in the region and thus has more traffic potential than PPS, which exclusively 
serves South American trade. Freeport handled more containers than PPS, however, the 
difference in real numbers is secondary to the change of market share. Freeport has 
become a significant port since 1993, out-performing its competition; whilst PPS began 
to be overshadowed by its rivals. Geographic position can explain differences in real 
traffic growth but cannot explain the difference in relative success. The disparity in 
facilities has been an important difference between the two, and the development of a 
given port is the result of management choices; which leads to the second central 
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question of the study - What have been the roles of the public sector and the private 
sector in both cases? 
The case of Freeport is very unique, and owes its existence to the Hawksbill Creek 
Agreement, which was signed forty years prior to the initial development of the container 
terminal. This document inadvertently provided the framework for FCP's success. The 
HCA allowed the private sector to completely develop the Freeport/Lucaya area with 
little oversight and eliminated most transaction costs and taxes; thus further suiting 
Freeport as an ideal transhipment centre, which HPH hopes to expand into a multi-modal 
export processing and logistics centre. By creating this unique governance structure, the 
Bahamian government has provided a glimpse of the potential of hub development that is 
completely guided by transnational terminal operators. The success of Freeport is a 
testament to the ability of the private sector to develop world-class facilities in a 
relatively short period of time and capture significant amounts of cargo when granted 
self-determination. This development has been aided by FCP's geographic location in 
the context of the transhipment phenomenon, however, it is the unique governance 
structure that has allowed FCP to thrive. There is not a single port in the Bahamas nor 
the surrounding islands that compares to FCP. Furthermore, FCP is outperforming its 
closest competition in Florida - Port Everglades, Miami, and Jacksonville. The common 
point of divergence is governance. 
PPS, on the other hand, is a port that is struggling to maintain its position as a 
regional sub-hub. PPS has languished as a PUBLIC port with poor performance and 
facilities, while its competition has modernized through privatization and has reaped the 
reward of expanding traffic. Puerto Cabello, Cartagena, and most significantly Colon 
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have each expanded their transhipment traffic after their privatization efforts in the 
1990s. Even more troubling is the fact that PPS's growth is less than that of its main 
intra-national competition, Point Lisas, which was a non-factor in 1993. The primary 
obstacle for PPS has been its governance structure, which is controlled through several 
layers of bureaucracy. The constraints of this bureaucracy are most apparent when one 
considers that PPS and FCP began their restructuring in 1993 and by the time PPS had 
finalized a restructuring plan in 2002, FCP had already constructed a new terminal that 
handled 860,000 TEU. 
This leads one to wonder why PPS was one of the last significant ports in the region 
to privatize given the success if its private competition? The answer rests in the way the 
government conceptualizes its most important gateway. The central government still 
views the port as a key political asset and has been unwilling to cede control. This 
explains the thirteen year restructuring process that resulted in a change of management 
of what are still sub-standard facilities. This is too cumbersome for the present 
transhipment market and PPS has suffered as a result, while at FCP the port has expanded 
quickly and rationally and has prospered under the control of HPH. 
The examination of the factors behind the differing levels of transhipment success 
demonstrates that the most divergent factor between PPS and FCP has been governance. 
Each case has illuminated the many arguments for and against public port authorities in 
the literature. The case of Freeport demonstrates how effective a transnational terminal 
operator can be at developing a hub when constraints are absent. Port-of-Spain 
demonstrates how politics can encumber a port to the point where it is unable to 
effectively compete in the global shipping market. Governance structures have affected 
87 
the development of facilities in a very competitive market, which in turn has created one 
port with a position to capitalize on an important opportunity while the other's 
significance in the basin deteriorates. 
6.2 Study difficulties 
Every effort was made to thoroughly complete this study, however, some 
questions still remain. The author was denied interviews with important figures in each 
case. In Trinidad, the Ministry of Transportation and Works was unwilling to grant an 
interview and in Freeport, the Grand Bahama Port Authority would not grant an 
interview. These are two very important stakeholders in this study and the research 
would have benefited tremendously from their input. 
As a result of this lack of access, the discussion on Port of Port-of-Spain is based 
in part on circumstantial evidence. An interview with the Ministry of Transportation and 
Works would have allowed for increased clarity regarding its role in the privatization 
effort, and its motivations. In Freeport, a greater sense of the GBP A would have aided in 
the analysis. 
A final weakness of this thesis is that the role of the shipping lines is not 
examined in detail. In many respects such an analysis is beyond the scope of this 
research, however, shipping lines are a significant factor in port success, especially in 
Freeport, where MSC dominates. 
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6.3 Future Research 
This study raises several interesting angles for further research. Firstly, the 
economic impact of the port privatizations can be undertaken shortly to assess the ability 
of the port reforms to spawn further economic activity via the multiplier effect. In the 
case of PPS, the effectiveness of their chosen model of a management contract can be 
evaluated and whether its delay in privatizing has rendered the port into a continued 
position of weakness or will the new management team be able to overcome PPS's 
obstacles and position it for success. 
Further research on Freeport's complete dependence on MSC in the context of 
research conducted by Freemont (2007) may provide further evidence to support his 
model of convergence hubs and port domination. Related to this is the ability of Freeport 
to maintain its position in the basin with its complete dependence on MSC's transhipment 
traffic, since transhipment traffic is fickle and the Caribbean transhipment industry 
remains very competitive. 
The most interesting future research, however, is in the examination of Freeport 
and its private governance structure. There is plenty of discussion in the literature about 
the pros and cons of public port authorities and Freeport provides a concrete case of a 
private port authority. The depth of this private governance applied to such a large area 
is unique and the GBPA's ability to act as a public governing body while operating as a 
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